RusAl
Running On Empty?

By
Herb Brandon
Israel News Agency
Jerusalem ---- October 24, 2007...... An international metals
bulleting Mineweb reports that most of the trouble Oleg Deripaska,
controlling shareholder of Rusal, has faced in the court claims
confronting him in the past, and the one from Michael Cherney
(Mikhail Chernoy) he currently faces in London, comes from the
fact that Deripaska seems not to have the money, with which
to meet his debts and obligations.
United
Company Rusal, based in Russia, is the world's largest aluminium
company. United Company RUSAL accounts for almost 12.5% of entire
global output of primary aluminium and 16 percent of the worlds
alumina production. The United Company is a result of the merger
of RUSAL, SUAL, and the alumina assets of Glencore, finished
in March 2007. The company operates in 17 countries on 5 continents
and employs 100,000 people across its international operations
and offices.
The
claims of Cherney's High Court lawsuit in England, including
shares, dividends, proceeds from Rusal asset sales, and Rusal-funded
transfers to Deripaska's personal holding and other companies
can be estimated at more than $5 billion. These claims are against
Rusal, Deripaska, his Moscow holding Basic Element, and his
worldwide assets.
By
contrast, Deripaska's considerable wealth is either an extrapolation
of the paper value of his shareholdings; some of them with acquisition
prices that are unknown; or a multiple of enterprise earnings,
minus debts that have been passed through a series of related-party
transactions. Accounting for these is as problematical as judging
the winner of a roulette spin, before the ball drops.
Although
not publicly announced, KPMG has been acting as the auditor
to US Rusal for its IPO. A banker to the deal has told Mineweb
the firm has supervised the consolidation of the trading units
used by Rusal in its tolling schemes, so that their revenues
are now reflected on a single balance-sheet. KPMG has also "signed
off that the company has paid all its tax". KPMG should
know what loans from Rusal to Deripaska companies remain outstanding,
and whether, in the meantime, Rusal is cash-positive. Netting
this cash against the size of the contingency claims Rusal and
Deripaska are facing is unlikely to leave a positive number.
The
numbers are also obscured by Rusal's custom of announcing huge
forward undertakings to spend money, and then quietly dropping
short. This month already, Rusal has announced promises to spend
more than a billion dollars on a new smelter and nuclear power
station in the Russian region of Saratov; and more than $3 billion
in a similar combination in Kyrgyzstan. Multi-billion dollar
promises for aluminium and power complexes are also in the offing
for Venezuela and Indonesia, and in several other regions of
Russia. Rusal also claims to have already invested $1.1 billion
on various metal projects in the first nine months of this year.
At
the same time, Oleg Deripaska has been publicly buying stakes
in a Canadian auto-parts builder, and Austrian construction
companies, costing almost $3 billion. The financing of these
transactions is not so obvious as the sale and purchase price.
But there is good reason to suppose that the cash element of
the deals comes from Rusal, by way of lending to Basic Element.
The reason is that this is exactly how Deripaska conducted his
business before, when details of the Rusal balance-sheet became
publicly visible for a brief instant.
One
of the problems the investment market in London faced recently,
when it considered Rusal's proposed share sale on the London
Stock Exchange - world's biggest IPO that never was - was that
none of this financial interaction was visible. Market briefings
in June revealed just five figures from Rusal's balance-sheet
- sales revenues; Ebitda; Ebit; net debt; and capital expenditure.
Even they were unaudited in the briefing papers circulated to
analysts in June and July. According to those papers, Rusal
said it "is committed to sustaining a capital structure
that makes efficient use of its balance sheet."
Efficiency
for whose balance-sheet was a question that took months of argument
among the banking syndicate when Rusal applied for a debt restructuring
loan of almost $1 billion in October 2003; at the time, that
was the biggest loan Deripaska's metal company business had
sought.
Then,
Deripaska was in urgent need of cash, because he had just agreed
to buy Roman Abramovich's 25 percent stake in Rusal for a price
estimated at the time between $1.5 and $2 billion. A premium
was paid, because Deripaska was afraid that Abramovich might
offer the stake to a rival, threatening Deripaska with being
put out of business. Two years earlier, in 2001, he had done
something similar. Fearful that Chernoy would sell his 20 percent
stake to rival Victor Vekselberg, Oleg Deripaska proposed buying
him out; offered $250 million in cash, but then complained he
didn't have enough money to pay the balance. A few months later,
Deripaska signed an agreement with Chernoy to borrow another
$100 million or so.
In
2001 and 2002, Mikhail Chernoy (Michael Cherney) was very obliging.
In 2003, knowing what happened to him, Abramovich insisted on
at least $500 million in cash up front. Rusal sources claimed
Deripaska was forced to pay everything, but there is some uncertainty
over whether Abramovich relented to allow Deripaska to pay a
balance in six-monthly instalments. But for a few weeks in September
of 2003, Deripaska's London banks knew he was extremely short
of cash, and short of collateral to borrow against.
A
loan he secured from the state savings Sberbank created a potential
default on Deripaska's prior borrowing agreement with then current
international lenders; they included BNP-Paribas, Natexis,.
Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB), ING, Societe Generale, Westdeutsche
Landesbank, and Standard Bank London. They admitted they were
worried that the collateral Deripaska had pledged for the Sberbank
loan included aluminium already securing the other bank loans.
Accordingly, they insisted on unprecedented financial disclosures,
and highly unusual securitization of Rusal's metal. Rusal thought
the syndicate negotiations would take weeks. They dragged on
for months.
It
was during this time that details of the Rusal balance-sheet
leaked. Mineweb published them on October 16, 2003. Rusal refused
to corroborate the details directly. But it dispatched a letter
to each member of the London banking syndicate, warning that
if a banker was found disclosing such details, the bank would
be evicted from the syndicate.
At
the time, the London bankers were less troubled at losing their
client than losing their shirts. For the balance-sheet details
indicated that Rusal had been advancing substantial short-term
loans to entities reported as "related parties". In
2002, these loans totaled $980 million. Over the year, the balance-sheet
documents claimed, $694 million of these loans were repaid.
At
the time, the balance-sheet for Rusal also revealed that, as
of December 31, 2002, the company held just $98 million in cash
at hand. A year earlier, there was only $37 million in the kitty.
The source for the balance-sheet told Mineweb "cash has
been taken out in great volume from Rusal in dividends for shareholders
and in loans to related parties." The shareholders in 2002-2003
were Deripaska and his holding, Basic Element, and Abramovich
and his holding, Millhouse. What was happening was that Deripaska
was emptying Rusal, in order to fund his buy-back of Rusal shares,
along with other assets for the holding. He kept telling Chernoy
there wasn't enough cash to pay his obligation from 2001.
In
2002, according to its balance-sheet, Rusal paid $834 million
in dividends to its shareholders. Basic Element, with a 50%
stake, is presumed to have taken half, or $417 million; while
Millhouse, the holding controlled by Abramovich and his associates,
took the other $417 million. Until Abramovich's sale to Deripaska
at the end of September, 2003, the same 50/50 sharing of dividends
should have occurred.
Related
party loans between Rusal and Basic Element are allowable, according
to the Russian civil code, if the board of directors and shareholders
vote to approve them. When Deripaska arranged the cash to buy
Abramovich's 25% stake, Millhouse directors on the Rusal board
should have approved a Rusal loan. But they declined at the
time to say if they had done so; one of the directors had trouble
remembering if he had been asked to vote. But once that transaction
took effect, Millhouse appointees were replaced by Rusal ones,
and the dealing between Rusal and Basic Element was now confined
within the family.
But
family, in the literal sense, can carry exceptional financial
risks. One of Deripaska's colleagues, Suleiman Kerimov, acknowledged
them when he took Polymetal, a gold mining asset he owns, to
IPO in London last February, intimating that if he and his wife
divorced, she might be entitled to half the value of his Polymetal
shareholding. "Any event or circumstance," recorded
the Polymetal prospectus at page 21, "affecting Mr. Kerimov
as a natural person, such as divorce, incapacity or death, may
have an impact on the control over, and ownership of his interest
in, the Company, or may lead to a change of control of the Company."
What
was also known at the time, making the divorce risk poignant,
if not pressing, was that Mrs. Kerimov owned 50 percent of the
company which Kerimov had used to buy Polymetal from its previous
owners. By contrast, when Roman Abramovich divorced his wife,
Mrs. Abramovich evidently did not enjoy comparable asset title.
And for this and the Kerimov reason, if Deripaska and Mrs Deripaska
were to go down the same path, he is likely to be obliged to
disclose, at least to current and potential shareholders of
Rusal, what assets he may have shared with his wife, and what
terms of marital asset dissolution he may have agreed to.
This
isn't the place to gossip about marriage. Still, when companies
are run the way Rusal and Basic Element are run, cash default
risk looms in the most unexpected places.
Bankers
to the attempted IPO have told Mineweb that Oleg Deripaska's
debts and legal liabilities ought not to impact on the market
assessment and valuation of Rusal, because the company is distinct
from the shareholder proprietor, and doesn't share in his liabilities.
The lawyers to the IPO argued that Chernoy's lawsuit, the liability
which has preoccupied the backroom discussions, was Deripaska's
problem, not Rusal's.
The
argument went like this: "In the event that Chernoy (Cherney)
were successful in his London High Court claim, Deripaska would
have to settle with him. That is between Deripaska and Chernoy.
The market would ask, how will Deripaska pay? He might pay by
selling shares in Rusal equal in value to the Chernoy claim.
Or he might pay by borrowing against or liquidating other assets.
If he is obliged to sell Rusal shares, the free float would
increase, so the company would gain standing in the market."
A
banker to the deal concluded: "I don't see any impact on
Rusal."
However,
there is a crucial omission. That is the balance-sheet item,
labelled related-party transactions, where it is disclosed how
much Rusal has advanced to Basic Element, and other Deripaska
companies, and how much he and they were (are) obligated to
repay. Joined at the head in this fashion, Deripaska and Rusal
face Deripaska's liabilities together. Trying to separate them
could be financially paralyzing to both.




