Israel Defense Forces: A Proud History
By Joel Leyden
Jerusalem----This is the proud story of the Israel Defense Forces. The Israel News Agency will be adding content and editing this IDF page in the days ahead. We begin with the creation of modern Israel.
A unique feature characterizing the first phase of Israel's War of Independence up to May 1948 was the "battle for the roads." The vast majority of Palestine's main roads ran through areas populated by Arabs, and by controlling the roads, the Arabs could effectively lay siege to areas of Jewish settlement. In March, having failed to capture Jewish settlements, the Arab forces concentrated on the battle for the roads, while continuing their attacks on outlying districts in the mixed towns and on settlements in the north, the Jerusalem mountains, and the Negev. Nevertheless, a convoy of armored trucks succeeded in making the trip from Negbah to Gat, which had been cut off for a long period, and an Arab arms convoy was ambushed and destroyed near Kiryat Motzkin. In general, the Arabs scored considerable success in the battle for the roads: on March 26 Jewish traffic on the coastal road leading to the Negev came to a complete stop; a convoy on its way back to Jerusalem from the Ezyon bloc was trapped near al-Nabi Daniyal and another, which tried to reach Yehiam, was ambushed and wiped out.
Throughout this period, however, the Jewish defense forces made substantial progress in organization and training. By the end of March, 21,000 men aged 17-25 were under arms. The manufacture of antitank projectiles, submachine guns, and explosives was greatly stepped up, and large quantities of light arms, purchased in Czechoslovakia, were expected to arrive. The yishuv's air force consisted of 30 light planes for reconaissance, transportation, and supply to isolated areas. The Arab forces-both the locally organized National Guard and the volunteers from the Arab states, were also growing.
On May 15, 1948, the day the British Mandate over Palestine ended, the armies of five neighboring Arab states invaded the new State of Israel, which had declared its independence the previous day. The invasion, heralded by an Egyptian air attack on Tel Aviv, was vigorously resisted. From the north, east and south came the armies of Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Transjordan, and Egypt. The invading forces were fully equipped with the standard weapons of a regular army of the time - artillery, tanks, armored cars and personnel carriers, in addition to machine guns, mortars and the usual small arms in great quantities, and full supplies of ammunition, oil, and gasoline. Further, Egypt, Iraq, and Syria had air forces. As sovereign states, they had no difficulty (as had the pre-state Jewish defense force) in securing whatever armaments they needed through normal channels from Britain and other friendly powers.
In contrast, the Jews had no matching artillery, no tanks, and no warplanes in the first days of the war. Some supplies of these weapons arrived in the days that followed, however, and turned the tide. Little more than small arms - in paucity- had been available to the Haganah which on May 28, 1948 was to merge with other Jewish defense groups to form the Israel Defense Forces. Two Jewish defense forces, the Irgun Zeva'i Le'ummi and the Lohamei Herut Israel agreed to cease their independent activities, (except in Jerusalem) and to absorb their members into the newly founded IDF. Invaded from all directions, Israel had to cope with the outbreak of a thousand fires, and to do so with limited means. Numerous settlement outposts in the Galilee and the Negev were isolated, open on all sides to Arab attack, and had to rely on their own perseverance and meager armories to stave off defeat. The hastily mobilized army had to engage in offensive action to remove the enemy from key positions, block the advance of their columns, and rush to seal gaps in Israel's defenses.
The Syrian attack on Degania A and Degania B began at dawn of 20 May 1948. The main objectives of the Syrian advance were the Jordan river bridges north of Degania A. After shelling the center of kibbutz by mortars and tank guns which continued even during the fights. An integrated Syrian force comprised of tanks, armored cars and infantry attacked the defense position at the outer perimeter of Degania A. They forced the defenders, 70 in number, out of their positions and into the communication trenches. Some of the Syrian tanks and armored vehicles were able to advance close to and eventually penetrate the kibbutz fence. But they were stopped by 20 mm cannons, Piat antitank shells and Molotov cocktails. One Renault 35 tank which penetrated into the kibbutz was attacked by Molotov cocktails and hand grenades . It remains in the kibbutz till today as a monument.
Present IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Moshe Yaalon
Syrian infantry troops who approached the kibbutz perimeters were stopped by the defenders. During the attack, Syrian artillery isolated the routes thus preventing reinforcements from arriving. The defenders' positions were hit and the defenders suffered casualties. Yet despite their losses and lack of appropriate weapons and ammunition, the defenders were able to hold their positions and the Syrians retreated after several of their armored vehicles were hit.
With the battle for Degania A over, the Syrians attacked Degania B. Shelling the kibbutz with mortar bombs as tanks and armored cars approached the kibbutz. This time the tanks stopped at a safe distance of 400 meters from the fence and shelled the defenders' positions.
Syrian infantry that attempted to approach the troops were driven back. A second assault by infantry and armored vehicles was also repelled. At this time new field artillery pieces arrived . They were thrown into action before their crews had the time to train with them. However the artillery barrages caused surprise and confusion among the Syrian troops who began to withdraw.
The battle ended with
the Syrian retreat. Israeli forces captured the village of Zemah, North-East
On 28 May 1948, the Provisional Government of the State of Israel issued Defense Army of Israel Ordinance No. 4. This ordinance, signed by Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, established the Israel Defense Forces, which would be comprised of "land forces, a navy and an air force". The ordinance was published in the Official Gazette No.3 of 31 May 1948.
In a state of emergency, conscription would be instituted and the age for conscripts would be set by the Provisional Government. The existence or establishment of any armed force other than the Israel Defense Forces was prohibited. Every individual serving in the IDF would be required to swear allegiance to the State of Israel, to its laws, and its legal bodies.
The general officers of the nascent Israel Defense Forces were sworn-in in a ceremony conducted on 27 June 1948.
The process of establishing a unified Israel Defense Forces was protracted. It began in the midst of the fighting against invading Arab armies. The Lehi resistance organization dissolved itself immediately upon the creation of the State of Israel and its members joined the IDF on an individual basis. However, in the Jerusalem area, the Lehi continued to function as an armed fighting force until 17 September 1948 when the organization in that sector was dissolved according to a government order issued after the assassination of the UN mediator Count Folke Bernadotte.
Individual battalions of the IZL joined the IDF with the exception of those fighting in Jerusalem. However, following the Altalena incident, these battalions were disbanded on 20 September 1948, and their soldiers joined the IDF on an individual basis as did all other citizens of the State of Israel.
The companies and battalions of the Palmach joined the IDF in a process which extended until the Chief of Staff ordered the dissolution of the Palmach on 29 October 1948, which became effective on 7th of November.
The creation of a unified IDF lasted almost 6 and a half months, from 28th of May 1948 till 7 November 1948.
The Israel Defense Forces was formed in battle. Many characteristics of the IDF which are evident today, originated in the fighting of 1948: the total mobilization of the society behind the war effort, the constant introduction of new weapons and techniques during the fighting, and the need of young commanders to establish their authority by successful leadership.
In human terms, the War of Independence was Israel's costliest war. More than 6,000 Israelis were killed and 15,000 wounded. It was one of the few instances when Israel faced almost equal forces on the other side: 35 to 45 thousand Israeli soldiers faced 42 to 54 thousand in the combined Arab armies. Although the Arab forces were marginally better equipped than the IDF, neither side employed tanks or planes in large numbers. The war was not characterized by a definite chronology or a marked beginning and end. Instead, it consisted of 39 separate operations, fought from the borders of Lebanon to the Sinai Peninsula and Eilat. Virtually the entire Jewish population of Palestine, then numbering 650,000 people, was mobilized in order to meet the coordinated assault of five regular Arab armies, in addition to Palestine's 1,000,000 Arabs.
A unique feature of the war up to May 1948 was the "battle of the roads". The vast majority of Palestine's main roads ran through areas populated by Arabs, and by controlling the roads, the Arabs could effectively lay siege to many jewish settlements. There was fierce fighting along the road to Jerusalem, since losing domination of this road meant risking the loss of Jerusalem itself. As a result, the defense of the road assumed prime importance, as did the task of delivering supplies to the besieged city. Convoys of armored trucks, sometimes escorted by jeeps, made the dangerous journey along the winding, hilly road, often under attack by Arab forces. Many of the convoys did not reach Jerusalem, a factor which led to Operation Nachshon. This operation, which took place between April 3 and April 15, 1948, involved 1,500 Jewish soldiers, using arms purchased in Czechoslovakia. The operation opened the Tel-Aviv-Jerusalem road long enough to allow three long convoys bearing arms, ammunition, and supplies to reach Jerusalem. The people of Jerusalem survived on the provisions brought by these convoys until the Burma Road (see Mickey Marcus), the route which outflanked the Arab positions, was completed, permanently ending the siege.
In the postwar years, until 1956, the Arab states maintained the military pressure by supporting terrorist and guerrilla infiltration across the borders. The continual pressure on the IDF, together with the country's very limited financial resources and population, led to the creation of a small standing army backed by a very large reserve force. The principle was Swiss, with major modifications.
The first test of this system came in the 1956 Sinai Campaign. More than 100 thousand soldiers were mobilized within seventy-two hours; the Israel Air Force (IAF) was fully operational within forty-three hours. Subsequent improvements have reduced the time for full IDF mobilization to a minimum.
In the early 1950s, the IDF Armored Corps underwent a number of changes in its command structure. Because of organizational flux and low standards of equipment maintenance, the Corps was poorly prepared to face the growing strength of the Egyptian Army. In 1955, Czechoslovakia began to supply the Egyptians with large quantities of arms, including tanks. The General Staff was forced to undertake immediate steps to rectify the situation. The Armored Corps' entire approach to combat was restricted to seizing strategic points and avoiding direct contact with the enemy. As a result of the Sinai Campaign, the Israeli armored doctrine was changed to one which called for maximum mobility and for actively seeking out the enemy. This change in turn affected the role of the infantry. The new emphasis on mobility was designed to prevent the enemy from regrouping. The success of the tank forces during the Sinai Campaign ensured that the new doctrine would find a place in the Israel Defense Forces.
In accordance with the new doctrine of seeking out the enemy, in the summer of 1953 a special, secret IDF unit was established (unit "101") to retaliate against Arab infiltration across the borders by striking at guerrilla bases inside enemy territory. The unit never comprised more than forty-five soldiers, and was integrated into the paratroopers after only five months. Nevertheless, its success in actively dealing with infiltration, as well as the mystique surrounding its operations, ensured that its style of combat had a great impact on the evolving IDF.
In 1948 all the resistance movements were joined together in order to form the IDF. One of the Hagana outfits - the Golany unit, was turned into the IDF first infantry brigade in February 48 - the Golani infantry brigade.
When reassigned under the IDF command, the Golany infantry brigade formed the Special Reconnaissance Platoon. This platoon was a Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) Unit, acting as pathfinder for the infantry brigade. But unlike the other reconnaissance platoons that existed in each of the Golany brigade's battalions, the Special Reconnaissance Platoon was also in charged on taking out key enemy strongholds, and execute more complex missions such as demolition and intelligence gathering.
The Special Reconnaissance Platoon was in fact the first official Israeli SF unit. Later, it evolved into Sayeret Golani, which is today considered as one of the finest units in the IDF.
In June 1948 the IDF formed its Paratroopers airborne unit - the T'zanhanim Company. The T'zanhanim Company was designed as an elite infantry unit tasked with the most demanding missions.
In the early 1950's the Arabs (both terrorists and full fledged armies) launched thousands of assaults against the Israeli borders, aimed mainly at civilians. The IDF attacked in retaliation, but the regular infantry units (including the T'zanhanim) were simply not up for the task. So in 1951 the IDF formed Unit 30 - a classified Unit that belonged to the IDF South command. Unit 30 was designed to execute retaliation missions while operating in small and well-trained teams.
However, Unit 30 operatives lacked sufficient and proper SF training, and performed poorly, so in 1952 the Unit was disbanded.
In August 1953, the IDF tried again to form a dedicated new SF unit, and created Unit 101 as a SF unit designed to perform complex missions far behind Israeli borders. Unit 101 was composed of 20-25 men, most of them former T'zanhanim and Unit 30 personnel.
The creation of Unit 101 was a major landmark in the Israeli SF history. Unit 101 established small unit maneuvers, activation and insertion tactics that are utilized even today. Beside Sayeret MATKAL, Unit 101 is considered to be the unit with the most influence on the Israeli infantry oriented units including both special and conventional units.
A place and miracle named Entebbe.
The name "Entebbe" and the operation with which it is associated enjoy a special place in the annals of the ongoing war against terrorism. To the people of Israel, and to many others, it was a declaration that free men need not submit to terrorist blackmail and extortion, no matter how impossible the alternatives may seem.
Entebbe Diary is dedicated to the scores of men who flew to Africa and back, and to the hundreds more who, by their unstinting efforts in planning and preparation, made the mission possible, and whose hearts went with their comrades to Entebbe.
"The basic assumption in our work is to prepare in the best possible fashion, so that we may stand quietly on the day of judgment, when it comes, in the knowledge that we did everything we could in the time that we had."
Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan Netanyahu, was killed in action in Entebbe, July 4, 1976.
At 6:45 on the morning of June 27, 1976, Singapore Airlines flight 763 landed at Athens Airport en route from Bahrain via Kuwait. Of the five disembarking passengers, four headed for the transit area to check in for Air France 139 to Paris, then settled down to a long wait in the transit lounge.
At 8:59 on the same morning, Captain Michel Bacos, at the controls of Air France 139, took off from Ben Gurion Airport on what promised to be a routine flight to Paris via Athens.
As the Airbus made its final approach to Athens, the boarding passengers, 58 in all, were being processed through passport and customs formalities. Nobody was on duty at the metal detector in the passenger corridor and the policeman at the fluoroscope was paying little attention to the screen at his side. In the line passing through to the bus that would take them across the tarmac to flight 139, were a twenty-five year old woman traveling on an Ecuadorian passport in the name of Ortega and, a few places behind her, a young blond-haired man whose Peruvian passport identified him as A. Garcia. Further back in the line were two dark-skinned youngsters with Bahraini and Kuwaiti travel documents.
The Airbus completed its approach to flight path "Red 19" and touched down at 11:30, to taxi to its parking spot, disgorge its 38 Athens-bound passengers and take on its 58 newcomers.
At 12:20 the flight was airborne and climbing steadily to its cruising height of 31,000 feet. The stewards and stewardesses were already busy in the galleys preparing lunch for the 246 passengers. Eight minutes after takeoff, "Ortega" and "Garcia" and their two Arab companions made their move. The young woman left her first-class seat and took up station at the front of the cabin; in the tourist compartment, the youngsters were already on their feet with guns in their hands. The blond youngster, a revolver in one hand and a grenade in the other, burst through the unlocked cockpit door.
Within minutes of the takeover of flight 139, Ben Gurion Airport management and the Air France station manager were aware that radio contact with Captain Bacos had been lost. The news was passed on to the Prime Minister, the Minister of Transport and the Defense Minister all of whom were at the regular Sunday Cabinet session.
At 13:27 , IDF Operations Branch put into motion the pre-planned procedures for coping with possible emergencies at Ben Gurion Airport. IDF Central Command promptly moved to establish a command post at the airport, and to alert the necessary army units.
Shortly after 14:00 hours, Air France 139 radioed Benghazi control tower, in Libya, demanding to have fuel available for at least four hours onward flight, and requesting that the local Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine representative be summoned to the airport.
The immediate destination was now clear, but everything indicated the the plane would be traveling on - and Ben Gurion Airport was a possibility. At 14:58, the airliner touched down in Benghazi and was directed to a remote runway. Nobody was allowed off the plane with the exception of one young woman who succeeded in convincing both the terrorists, and a hastily summoned Libyan doctor, that she was pregnant and in danger of miscarrying. The woman, who was in fact on her way to her mother's funeral in Manchester, England, spent an anxious few hours in the airport terminal, and was then put on a plane to England.
Meanwhile, in Jerusalem, Prime Minister Rabin passed a note to the Cabinet Secretary to convene, in his office after the Cabinet session, a small team of ministers: Defense Minister Peres, Foreign Minister Allon, Transport Minister Yaakobi, Justice Minister Zadok and Minister without portfolio Galilee. Whichever way the Air France 139 episode would develop, these were the men who would have to take the decisions. The meeting, which convened at 16:05, decided very quickly on a number of immediate measures. Yigal Allon was to contact his French counterpart and demand that the French government do everything in its power to obtain the release of the passengers; 139 was after all an Air France plane. Gad Yaakobi would approach the international civil aviation authorities with a similar request, and would establish liaison with the families of the hostages and the communications media. All the arms of Israeli security would take all the necessary steps in the eventuality that the plane was destined for Israel.
After a long wait on the deserted runway at Benghazi, the Airbus, having taken on 42 tons of fuel, started its engines, gathered speed and, at 21:50 on the evening of June 27, was airborne.
At Ben Gurion Airport, where it was now known that 77 Israeli nationals were on board the plane, IDF Chief-of-Staff Mordechai ("Motta") Gur phoned Shimon Peres, who decided to come to the airport himself. It was slowly becoming clear that the aircraft, with its range of 2500 miles, was heading away from the Middle East in a southerly direction. Nevertheless, all the security preparations were kept in force.
With only a few minutes fuel left in its tanks, Air France 139 landed at Entebbe, in Uganda, at 03:15 local time on the morning of June 28. The units at Ben Gurion Airport were ordered back to their bases, and the command post disbanded. Whatever would happen from here on, it would not require elaborate preparations at Ben Gurion Airport.
Monday June 28, was a day of questions - but no answers! Was Entebbe the final destination, or only a refueling station in the onward flight of Air France 139? Were the Ugandans unwilling hosts or active partners in the hijacking? Idi Amin, the Ugandan dictator, had not been exactly friendly to Israel since March, 1972, when he had been refused a squadron of Phantom jets with which to bomb Kenya and Tanzania, and had countered by expelling all Israelis from his country.
On the ground in Entebbe, the situation was clearer. At daybreak, the hostages had been able to see, through the windows of the plane, several additional terrorists, as well as Ugandan soldiers massing on the lawn alongside the runway. Idi Amin had put in a personal appearance during the morning, arousing a brief optimism on board the Airbus. But, at midday the hostages had been transferred to the Old Terminal building through a cordon of Ugandan soldiers, whose weapons were pointing ominously at them. Later in the afternoon, Amin had paid a visit and made a speech in support of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
Despite the uncertainties, some steps were taken in Israel. The French Government had been contacted, and had accepted responsibility for the safety of the passengers, and for the diplomatic efforts that would be made to obtain their release. Transport Minister Yaacobi persuaded the press and the electronic media not to publish lists of names; the chance existed, however slim, that some of the Israeli hostages might be mistaken for citizens of other countries. The Military Censor was roped in to delete any inadvertent hints that could help the hijackers.
Defense Minister Peres told his assistants, in an afternoon session, that if Amin was helping the hijackers, this would be a dangerous precedent; so far, no aircraft hijacking had enjoyed the overt assistance of any president, army or state. If this was the case, and it did succeed-no aircraft would be safe again in African skies. Therefore, it was vital to know what was the actually happening at Entebbe.
Within the IDF no command decisions were being taken-or were called for. Nevertheless, in the joint air and ground staffs of Combined Operations, questions were beginning to be asked and ideas raised-almost as a matter of routine. There was no problem involved with the range; up to March 1972, Hercules aircraft of the IAF had flown regular flights with supplies for the Israeli mission in Uganda. But the Air Force needed to know - against any eventuality - whether any changes had been made on the runways and other airport installations, and whether any anti- aircraft measures had been taken at the airport or on its approaches. There would also be a need for information about normal practices with runway lights, radar and all other details concerning access to an international airport.
At the end of the day, the biggest question of all remained unanswered: What were the hijackers going to demand in return for the release of their prize?
At dawn on June 29, the only available new information was a brief description of the hijackers, which had come in from Major General Rehavam Zeevi in London. Zeevi, the Prime Minister's advisor on terrorism, had been in Europe when the hijacking took place, and was asked to remain there to coordinate contacts with the French government and efforts to obtain any relevant data.
At 08:30, PrimeMinister Rabin met with the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee of the Knesset, Israel's Parliament, to bring its members up to date on the hijacking and the decisions taken on the previous day by the ministerial team. Later in the morning, in keeping with his awareness that critical security problems transcend party barriers, Rabin sat in private session with Menahem Begin, the leader of the Likud opposition. At the end of their meeting the Prime Minister offered to keep Begin posted on any developments in the situation.
A meeting of the ministerial team was set for five in the afternoon. In the early afternoon, the Prime Minister asked that IDF Chief-of-Staff Gur be summoned to take part in the session. A routine exercise was in progress in Sinai, and the call to Gur caught him as he was about to board a helicopter at Dov Airport in north Tel Aviv, on his way to watch the maneuvers in the south. Before ascending the hills to Jerusalem, the C-O-S called Deputy Head of General Staff Branch, Brig. Gen. Avigdor Ben-Gal, and told him to "start thinking about plans for Entebbe..." The Air Force and Combined Operations Officers, who had been "thinking" since the day before, were now free to move into higher gear.
The Prime Minister opened the five oclock meeting with a direct question to Lieutenant-General Gur:Has the IDF any proposal on how to extricate the hostages?The General replied that it was too early, but options were being examined. There followed a few moments debate on possible tactics, but this was cut short by Shimon Peres, who suggested that this was neither the time nor the place to discuss operational matters before they had been properly examined.
Minutes before the meeting, both the Foreign Ministry and the Defense Ministry received from Paris, a preliminary list of terrorists, held in Israel, France, Germany, Switzerland and Kenya, whose release was being demanded by the hijackers in Entebbe. The Director-General of the Foreign Ministry phoned the list through to the cabinet room. Now the price was clear and now there was hard information on who was responsible. The ministers were given a briefing by the intelligence consultant who was sitting in, on the PFLP and its head, Dr. Wadia Hadad.
The Prime Minister closed the meeting with an announcement of a special government session at eleven the next morning.
Early in the evening, another cable from the Paris embassy was placed on Foreign Minister Allons desk. this one contained all the technical details of the exchange of terrorists for hostages, and set a deadline -14:00 hours, Israel time, on Thursday, July 1. If their demands were not met, the terrorists threatened to blow up the plane and its passengers.
At 21:00 hours, a small group of IDF generals sat facing Shimon Peres and Motta Gur, while each in turn outlined his preliminary ideas. Kuti Adam, who henceforward would be coordinator and motive force in planning the operation, spoke briefly of three possible options, then turned to Major General Benny Peled, GOC Air Force, for his evaluation of the logistics involved in getting to Entebbe. Peled whose planning officers had been working on the problem for 36 hours, explained all the problematics, then stated that the necessary force ("1200 men with all their equipment, if you want") could be flown, nonstop, to target. It was too early for operational decisions, but the Air Force had said, loud and clear, that it could be done.
Unknown to the officers in Tel Aviv, Ugandan soldiers in Entebbe had spent the part of the afternoon cutting an opening from the hostages' hall in the old terminal through to the next room, and had nailed planks in the shape of a "T" across the opening.
The hostages were encouraged to believe that more space was being made available to alleviate their cramped conditions. But in the late evening, Wilfried Boese, the blond-haired hijacker, appeared and announced that he was going to read a list of names, and that all those mentioned should crawl through the opening into the next room. Despite his assurances that the list had nothing to do with nationality, it was clear that he was naming only Israelis and Jews. The German word Selektion was muttered around the room - a reminder of Dr. Josef Mengele at Auschwitz choosing those who would live and those who would die!
During the late evening, and into the night, an Israel Air Force officer was making phone calls to senior Air Force personnel, serving and retired, who had seen duty in Uganda. All received the same message:Report to the Deputy Chief of Intelligence Branch at one a.m.! From elsewhere in the General Staff, similar calls were going out to officers who had enjoyed a personal relationship with Idi Amin, to meet in the P.M.s office at 08:00 hours (their squadron leader, Lt.Col. S., was called out of a wedding party in Haifa to receive his summons); and to ground forces combat officers, whose input was now required by the planning teams.
Ehud Barak, the Deputy Head of IDF Intelligence Branch, had two meetings scheduled during the early hours of Wednesday, June 30. At 01:00 he met with senior Air Force officers who had spent time in Uganda, to find out everythig they could tell him about Entebbe Airport, other airbases in Uganda, Idi Amins air force - and anything else that came to mind. At 04:00 hours, he chaired a meeting of the planners to survey progress. There were ideas, but nothing concrete so far; in fact, both meetings were more concerned with listing the gray areas where information was needed, and with compiling checklist of possible sources. Among the officers now present in the meetings was Muki, a young paratroop major, who had been called in that night; his assignment would be to consider all the possibilities of seizing the Old Terminal and eliminating the terrorists.
The strangest meeting of all to take place during that day was in Shimon Peres office, where the Defense Minister was picking the brains of a handful of air force and army officers who were personally acquainted and even friendly with Idi Amin. Slowly but surely, Peres was putting together a psychological profile of the African dictator - including details like Amins ambition to be awarded the Nobel prize for Peace, and his mothers appearance to him in a dream to warn him against ever harming the Jews. As a direct outcome of this session, a retired IDF colonel, Burka Bar-Lev, was led into a nearby room to wait while an international call was placed to Kampala. In the ensuing conversation with Idi Amin, and others that followed over the next few days, Bar-Lev was instructed to play heavily on Amins ego and their personal friendship to extract every bit of useful information and gain as much time as possible. Through most of the conversations, Peres listened in on an extension phone, taking note of everything of importance that Amin let slip.
The Government of Israel convened, in full session, at 11:00 hours in the Cabinet Room of the Knesset. The only really new developments to report were the refusals of the governments of France and West Germany to give up terrorists from their prisons. The French had however, quietly intimated that they would follow Israels lead. The consensus of the meeting, as summed up by Prime Minister Rabin, was that there was still time to decide; the Cabinet would be summoned again either later in the day or the following morning, a few hours before the ultimatum was scheduled to expire.
At Air Force Headquarters, General Peled and his officers were fitting together the pieces of data to make a full picture. Peleds most basic concern was not with the logistics of reaching Entebbe, but rather with the possibility that unidentified aircraft might be fired on. he had already concluded that little was to be feared from radar detection on route. Even if the planes did show up on hostile radar screens, it was unlikely that they would be believed to be Israeli aircraft so far from home.
At Entebbe, 47 hostages of the non-Israeli group were being herded on board awaiting an Air France plane. Captain Bacos and his crew from flight 139 refused to leave. They were adamant about staying with their passengers to the very end. A French nun also insisted on staying and giving up her place to someone else, but the Ugandans took no notice of her protests, and she was shoved on board the plane.
During the afternoon, two officers of the IDF returned to central Israel from the exercises in the south, to find that they were urgently required to report to the General Staff. One of them was Brigadier General Dan Shomron, Chief Paratroop and Infantry Officer, and his summons was to a briefing by Major General Kuti Adam at 15:30 hours. The second officer was Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan (Yoni) Netanyahu, and his meeting was with his own deputy, Muki, who wanted to bring his C. O. into the picture. Neither of these men had been aware of frenzied activity taking place within the small inner circle; they were not alone in this - as the requirements of security had even left most of the generals of the IDF General Staff in the dark about the search for the possible military option.
It was a busy evening. At 21:00 hours, Dan Shomron convened a meeting session at his headquarters. Two hours earlier, Prime Minister Rabin met the editors of Israels daily press to discuss with them aspects of the terrorist ultimatum and the diplomatic efforts, and to urge restraint in covering the story. From that meeting, Rabin went straight into session with the small ministerial team, again opening the proceedings with a direct question do we have a military option? addressed to the Chief of Staff, again receiving a terse not yet! After hearing reports from Foreign Minister Allon on the diplomatic scene, Shimon Peres reviewed the ideas already produced in the IDF - but there were still gaps in the available intelligence data. The team would meet again in the morning, before the Cabinet session that would have to decide about the 2 p.m. ultimatum.
At Orly Airport outside Paris, Foreign Minister Jean Sauvagnargues welcomed the 47 hostages from Entebbe in the name of the President of France. A number of men circulated in the crowd, discreetly collecting names and addresses. Late into the night, there would be knocks on the doors of families celebrating the safe homecoming of their kin, and questions would be asked: the number of terrorists, what weapons were they carrying and what were they wearing, how were the hostages housed, how many Ugandans were around the building and how were they behaving? Despite the lateness of the hour and the strangeness of the circumstances, none of the nocturnal visitors were turned away empty-handed.
Meanwhile, in Tel-Aviv, Defense Minister Peres was sitting in his crowded office, listening to Kuti Adam, Benny Peled, Intelligence Branch Chief Shlomo Gazit and their assistants. Three possible plans were taking shape: a parachute drop into Lake Victoria and a quiet landing at Entebbe from rubber boats, a large-scale crossing of the lake from the Kenyan shore - using whatever craft could be rented, borrowed or stolen, and a direct landing at Entebbe, a quick assault and a fast removal of the hostages by air. Both of the first two plans depended on releasing the hostages then relying on either Idi Amin or UN intercession to get them out. They would drop by the wayside over the coming hours, both for military reasons and because the data coming in from Paris would confirm that the Ugandans were active partners in the hijacking. In the meantime, the problem was still insufficient information - and the clock was ticking away the vital minutes to midday on Thursday, July 1.
At the early morning meeting of Intelligence Branch planners, one of the points that came to light was the fact that an Israeli building contractor had built installations at Entebbe, including the Old Terminal. At 08:00 hours when the normal working day was beginning in Tel Aviv, young officers in civilian clothes paid visits to tourist agencies and airline offices to enquire about flight schedules in East Africa. Another small group descended on the headquarters of one of Israels biggest building companies in order to borrow in strictest confidence their blueprints of Entebbe airport, and, most particularly of the Old Terminal building.
Shimon Peres sat at his desk, reading over the transcript of the previous nights phone call to Idi Amin, and refreshing his memory about the information that the Ugandan leader, perhaps inadvertently, and let slip to his old friend, Burka Bar-Lev. Peres was convinced, based on his last session with the officers of the General Staff, that there had to be a military option and that it was only a matter of time till all of the pieces fell into place. He was absolutely certain that giving way to terrorist extortion was not the path that a sovereign state should choose. At 07:45, when the ministerial team convened, Peres stressed his convictions, but the clock on the wall - which showed 08:40 as the meeting ended - was against him.
All eighteen ministers in the Cabinet meeting that began at 09:00 hours were very conscious of the limited time remaining. But the issues were too serious to pass without some debate. After hearing the opening round of discussion, Yitzhak Rabin apologized to his colleagues, and departed for a brief session with the members of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, at which he read out the proposed text of a government resolution in favor of negotiation for the release of the hostages, and asked the opinions of the men present. He went out of his way to state that the Minister of Defense, and some other Cabinet ministers, were on record as saying that they would vote for negotiation solely as a means of gaining time. After a brief recess, requested by the head of the opposition, in order to allow consultation, the Prime Minister was assured of the committees agreement for what he felt he had to do.
Returning to the Cabinet Room, Rabin called for a vote, insisting that each man must vote yes or no; there could be no avoidance of responsibility by abstention. The vote was unanimous in favor of negotiation, it being recorded in the minutes of the meeting that Shimon Peres, and Shlomo Hillel, the Minister of Police, regarded the decision as a tactic to gain time. Yigal Allon placed an urgent phone call to the Ambassador of France, and asked him to inform the French Foreign Minister immediately. There were ninety minutes to spare to the expiration of the ultimatum.
The answer was not slow in coming. Idi Amin told Burka Bar- Lev that the PFLP would broadcast on Ugandan Radio at two p.m. Israel time. He would say no more than that. The PFLP had extended the ultimatum to 14:00 hours on Sunday, July 4, a fact that Amin had already announced in yet another personal visit to the hostages in the Old Terminal.
The tension of the morning hours and the relief of temporary reprieve in the afternoon made little difference to the IDF. The air and ground forces teams had achieved substantial progress now that the required - and requested - data was pouring in. There was still one major gap in intelligence, - any changes that might have been made to runways, taxi paths and other installations at Entebbe in the four years since the Israel Air Force had last visited Uganda.
However, assurances had been given that every effort was being made to get an up-dated picture; in any case, the ground plans of international airports were not exactly top secret.
At 10:00 hours, while the members of the Government were agonizing over their decision, Chief Paratroop and Infantry officer, Brig. Gen. Dan Shomron, was presenting his preliminary ideas to Major General Adam. At 15:15 hours, a group of senior officers convened in Shimon Peres office to listen to the ministers report on the decision to negotiate. But that was not all. Peres went on to provoke a discussion on the probabilities of success of a military operation - though it must have seemed in conflict with the political situation. Despite the general atmosphere of caution, Benny Peled and Kuti Adam were optimistic. Forty-five minutes later, Major General Adam formally ordered Shomron to flesh out the details of a military operation to rescue the hostages.
At 17:00 hours, Dan Shomron and his team were in joint session with the Air Force planners and, at 18:30, a more detailed conception was presented to Shimon Peres, as a result of which the Defense Minister approved the preparation of operational orders. Dan Shomron was appointed to command the operation on the ground.
Throughout the evening, the circle widened. Lt. Colonel Netanyahu was again summoned from the south by his deputy, to be brought up to date, in a late night session, on the various ideas for an assault on the Old Terminal. They adjourned at 03:00 hours - Yoni Netanyahu to get some sleep, and Muki to draw up the assignments for their men and to list the equipment they would need. The Senior Medical Officer, at the Head of Communications and Electronics Branch were called in to be briefed, then departed to set their own wheels in motion. At IDF Air Force headquarters, lists were being drawn up of pilots and aircrew, some of them reservists, the main criterion being experience in long-range flights over Africa. Brigadier Shomron instructed his headquarters to bring in troops, drawn from three units, to a relatively quiet base in central Israel. The units should be drawn from Yoni Netanyahus paratroops, another paratroop unit and the Golani Infantry Brigade. Golani had endured a long tradition of being the unit to which all rejects from other IDF echelons had been sent. In the years preceding the Yom Kippur War, the brigade had demonstrated a remarkable ability to pull itself up by its own bootstraps and was now recognized as an elite unit. The choice for the Entebbe operation was yet another recognition of its new status in the IDF. Meanwhile, strict instructions were being issued to maintain communications silence; there was to be no hint in telephone conversations, or among the uninitiated, about what was in the wind.
During the night, Kuti Adam ordered the erection of a full-scale model of the Entebbe Old Terminal, based on the available blueprints and photographs, at the base where Yoni Netanyahus men were now assembling; they would exercise on the model, with the help of a Hercules aircraft parked nearby. Almost as an afterthought, the Computer Center was asked to provide a code name for the operation: after rejecting their first offering, Shomron accepted Operation Thunderball.
Meanwhile, a second group of 101 non-Israeli hostages had arrived in Paris. There was a double implication: there were fewer hostages to bring out of Entebbe; on the other hand, the knowledge that the terrorists were now holding Israelis and Jews exclusively, had to raise doubts about the sincerity of their negotiations. In any case, they had already intimated, via the Somali Ambassador to Uganda, who was serving as go-between for the French, that they were not interested in negotiation - only in total satisfaction of their demands. One supposition was that the ultimatum had been extended only to save Idi Amin embarrassment at the meeting of the Organization of African Unity scheduled to take place over the weekend.
In discussion with the other generals, IDF Chief of Staff Gur was still not convinced that the now rapidly evolving plan was feasible. However, he agreed to with old judgment until some detail were drilled both on the ground and in the air. Thus, as dawn broke on Friday, July 2, all the preparations were being made for an operation that had not yet been approved by the Chief of Staff. Shortly after midnight, Dan Shomron had a brief session with the Prime Minister, but the basis was still lets wait and see.
At 08:00 on Friday, July 2, an Orders Group took place for the officers of the units assigned to Thunderball. At 08:30, while three IDF Hercules aircraft were landing at the base, to serve as stage props for the rehearsals of the operation, the Air Force team was presenting its detailed planning to General Motta Gur. The pilots were assuming a flight plan that would bring them to Entebbe in a time slot between one commercial airliner taking off and another landing. It was highly unlikely that the control tower would bother to turn off the runway lights for a short period; in any case, Entebbe was, for the next few days, the duty airport for emergencies over East Africa. However, the IDF Chief of Staff was concerned about the dangers of landing in the dark, so it was agreed that he should fly with Lt. Col. S., the command pilot, in a night exercise, to prove that a Hercules could be landed safely without runway lights. For the time being, the assumption was that the aircraft would be refueled at Entebbe, from the airports own tanks - though Nairobi, in Kenya was suggested as a possible alternative.
At 10:00 hours, Yoni Netanyahu, Muki and their officers started to run through all the possible variants of an assault on the Old Terminal, while the other units mapped out their roles in securing the rest of the airport, including the New Terminal, and control tower, and the refueling area.
Elsewhere, IDF Air Force ground crews were hard at work on routine maintenance plus of seven aircraft: four Hercules would be needed (there had been a suggestion to take many more - but Muki had argued vigorously and effectively against too large a force); one extra Hercules would be held in reserve; two Boeing 707s were included in the plan - though they would not be landing at Entebbe. Brigadier Dan Michaels staff in the IDF Medical Corps were assembling the equipment that would be needed to convert one Boeing into a flying medical facility. While Brigadier Yisrael Zamir, the Chief Communications Officer, was working with his team on equipping the other as a communications link.
At 12:00 noon, the unit commanders presented their detailed plans for approval by Chief Paratroop and Infantry officer Shomron. Two hours later, Yoni Netanyahu convened his own officers for a final Orders Group before the rehearsals on the model. There was some concern over how to achieve maximal surprise: the assault team would have to cover quite a distance by road to the Old Terminal, since taxing the aircraft too close to the building was bound to alert the terrorists and the Ugandans. Muki suddenly had a brainwave. He grabbed a phone and told a startled staff officer in Tel Aviv that they must have a Mercedes limousine immediately. Putting down the receiver, he explained that all senior Ugandan officers, including Amin himself, always traveled by black Mercedes. A limousine, escorted by Landrovers, would be a normal enough sight not to arouse undue interest until it was too late.
As the light was fading, at 17:00 hours, the assigned aircrews gathered for a briefing on the drills that were to take place after dark. Immediately after the briefing, Lt. Col. S. settled down at the controls of Hercules, with Lt. Gen. Gur and Maj. Gen. Peled at his shoulder. Motta Gur had already told the pilots that it made no difference to the combat teams where they had to perform; it was the pilots job to bring them safely to their destination. Lt. Col. S. now had to convince Motta that the pilots could indeed make a blind landing - if they needed to. The plane took off and flew south to Ophir, at the southern tip of Sinai. There , it made a landing on a dark runway, but once was not enough for the COS, so Lt. Col. S. took off again and repeated the maneuver. Coming into Ophir airfield, the plane was a hundred yards off line, but there was ample time to correct - and the landing was again satisfactory. The Israeli Air Force had made its point.
Meanwhile, Yonis paratroops were exercising, time and again, the drive to the model and the assault and elimination of the terrorists, while their CO held a stopwatch, urging them to clip more seconds until he was satisfied. A Mercedes limousine had indeed arrived, borrowed from a car dealer who specialized in used taxicabs, but no - to Muki's horror - it was white! Never mind! That problem could be dealt with later.
At 22:45 hours, after Lt. Col. S. had brought his load of top brass back from Ophir, the paratroops performed once again. this time with the Hercules, and with the Chief-of-Staff watching.
At 01:00, on the early morning of Saturday, July 3, Motta Gur phoned Shimon Peres and reported that the men were ready - and the operation could be staged. The news throughout the day had not been promissing: the Embassy in Paris was relaying messages that indicated no progress, and no obvious desire for progress, on the diplomatic front. Now there was at least a ray of light.
Throughout the night, IDF army mechanics labored on the engine of the aging Mercedes. As they finished, two soldiers began to slap black paint on the white bodywork. Yoni and Muki spent the remaining hours of darkness reviewing every aspect of the assault and devising answers eventualities. Air Force headquarters drafted detailed operational orders and, at 05:00, issued them to the transport squadron. Briefing of the aircrews was set for 08:45 hours. Shortly after dawn, the combat units loaded their equipment, and drove on deserted road to a nearby airbase, where ground crews stood ready to lash their vehicles securely in the bellies of the waiting aircraft. Alongside a runway, Dan Michaeli's doctors and medical orderlies made a last check of the equipment to be loaded on board the "hospital" Boeing. The IDF Medical Corps had quietly called in reservist doctors, with no explanations offered for the unusual summons.
It was a sunny morning in Israel, the plight of the Entebbe hostages overshadowed the normal Sabbath joys. There were no indications of progress in the negotiations for their release, and indeed it seemed that terrorists were only interested in inforcing Israel to its knees in a humiliating capitulation. Via France, Israel had insisted that the exchange must take place at a neutral venue, preferably Paris, but the answer had been an outright refusal. There was little certainty in anybody's mind that trading convicted terrorists would save the lives of 105 men, women and children in the Entebbe Old Terminal.
Shortly after 11:00, the small ministerial team convened, for the last time, in the Prime Minister's Tel Aviv office. They listened in silence to General Gur's detailed presentation of the Israel Defense Forces Operation Thunderball. It was not a total surprise, since Shimon Peres had already told three of the ministers that a military option had opened up. Perhaps to retain a sense of the gravity of the situation, Yitzhak Rabin reviewed the risks involved and the implications of failure. The meeting concluded with a question to Motta Gur: "When do the planes have to go". The answer was:"Shortly after 1 p.m. from central Israel."
Most of the ministers who gathered for the full Cabinet session, immediately after the team meeting, were expecting the agenda to contain just one item: a decision to accede to the hijackers' demands before tomorrow's deadline. Despite the holiness of the Sabbath, all the Cabinet members were present; one religious minister who lived in Jerusalem had received a hint from his colleague, Transport Minister Yaakobi - at midday on Friday - that he would not regret taking his family to Tel Aviv for the weekend.
The gloomy atmosphere and long faces gave way to growing astonishment as the Chief-of-Staff spread maps, sketches and photographs across the table, and began yet another detailed briefing. While General Gur was speaking, the heavy doors of five Hercules aircraft slammed shut, and the planes began to gather speed on the runway. At 13:20, they were airborne and southbound for Ophir at the tip of the Sinai peninsula. The flight plan envisaged a last staging point as far south as possible, for reasons of both timing and range. But normal flight paths would have taken the aircraft westward over crowded Tel Aviv beaches, before making the turn south. And there was no way that so many aircraft in the Sabbath skies could have passed overhead without arousing speculation. So each of the five planes took a separate route across the heartland of Israel. Over the Negev and Sinai deserts, the upcurrents of hot air made it a very rough flight. The soldiers on board the transports had been issued airsickness pills, but the turbulence was so bad that they were glad to set foot on solid ground at Ophir.
In the Cabinet Room in Tel Aviv, Motta Gur concluded his briefing and the ministers were asking questions. Time was now short, but no attempt was made to stop the discussion: the decision was too important to rush the Government of Israel into it. At Ophir, four heavily laden transports (their payloads as much as 20,000 pounds over normal rated capacity) lumbered through the thin desert air and, after using up the whole length of the runway, were airborne. Watching them go were a very airsick paratrooper - and a very frustrated pilot of the reserve Hercules. The prevailing winds and weather forced the four planes to take off northwards, then bank slowly - five degrees at time - back to their southerly course, making part of their turn over the empty desert wastes of Saudi Arabia.
A note passed across the table from Yitzhak Rabin to Shimon Peres suggesting that the planes should go: they could always be recalled. From Peres' smile, the Prime minister could understand that "Operation Thunderball" was already on its way. As if they had all the time in the world, Rabin summed up the debate, then called for a vote. It was unanimous: the Israel Defense Forces was going to Entebbe.
Fifteen minutes after the last Hercules was airborne out of Ophir, the second Boeing was on its way south from an airbase in central Israel. It would also land at Ophir, then follow the transports - three hours behind to allow for its higher speed. On board were Major General Kuti Adam, another senior officer, and a team of communications operators.
In the cockpits of the four transport planes, which were now flying low over the Gulf of Suez, beneath the height of hostile radar surveillance, the pilots were studying a batch of aerial photographs of Entebbe Airport. taken by an amateur, at an angle, from Kenyan airspace over Lake Victoria, and shoved into the pilots' hands seconds before takeoff. They held the answers to the remaining questions. In the bellies of the aircraft, the soldiers of the assault teams, and the doctors and corpsmen who were to land with them, sprawled alongside their vehicles getting whatever sleep they could. Some of the officers were studying their maps and orders again, making sure that everything was committed to memory.
Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres went home for a few hours to try and relax before the long night ahead. Peres was expecting dinner guests, and there was no way to postpone without arousing speculation. Rabin had spent the last few minutes before leaving his office on the phone to France, doing his best to invent plausible reasons for delaying the negotiations, yet unable to tell General Zeevi in Paris what was actually happening.
Around the dinner table in Peres' home, the talk quite naturally turned to the plight of the hostages in Entebbe. In the hope of keeping up pretenses before his American VIP guest of honor, the Minister of Defense turned to another of his guests, the publisher of a Tel Aviv daily who was known for his dovish attitudes, and asked him what he would do under the circumstances. Fully expecting an ardent plea for unconditional capitulation to the terrorists' demands, Shimon Peres was astonished by the publishers answer: "Send the IDF!" Fortunately, General Gazit, the head of the Intelligence Branch, was able to help his host explain just how impossible that idea was.
Motta Gur, who was spending every available hour with his family-his wife's father had died earlier in the week-returned to his headquarters to chair a meeting of the General Staff. The generals, like the cabinet ministers that same morning, were convinced that they had been summoned to hear details of an exchange of convicted terrorists for hostages, and were surprised at the at the conspicuous absence of Kuti Adam until Gur began to speak!
Turning westward, the four Hercules headed into the African continent over Ethiopia. The weather was stormy, forcing the pilots to divert northwards close to the Sudanese frontier. However, there were no fears of detection. Firstly, it was doubtful that any alert radar operators would be able to identify the planes as Israeli and secondly, the storm would wreak havoc with incoming signals on the screens. On the approaches to Lake Victoria, they hit storm clouds towering in a solid mass from ground level to 40,000 feet. There was no time to go around, and no way to go above-so they ploughed on through. Conditions were so bad that the cockpit windows were blue with the flashes of static electricity.
Lt.Col. S. held the lead plane straight on course; his cargo of 86 officers and men and Dan Shomron's forward command post with their vehicles and equipment had to be on the ground according to a precise timetable. The other pilots had no choice but to circle inside the storm for a few extra minutes.
Yitzhak Rabin and some of the other ministers joined Shimon Peres in his office, and waited tensely for a sign of life from the radio link-up on his desk. Shortly before 23:00 hours, they heard a terse "over 'Jordan'" from Kuti Adam, confirming that the planes had reached Lake Victoria.
Lt. Col. S. held course southward, then banked sharply to line up on Entebbe main runway from the southwest. In the distance he could see that the runway lights were on. Behind him in the cargo compartment, Yoni Netanyahu's men were piling into the Mercedes and the two Landrovers. The car engines were already running, and members of the aircrew were standing by to release the restraining cables. At 23:01, only 30 seconds behind the preplanned schedule, Lt. Col.S. brought the aircraft in to touch down at Entebbe. The rear ramp of the plane was already open, and the vehicles were on the ground and moving away before the Hercules rolled to a stop. A handful of paratroopers had already dropped off the plane to place emergency beacons next to the runway lights, in case the control tower shot them down. Lt. Col. S. switches on his radio for a second:"I am on 'Shoshana'."
The Mercedes, and its escorts, moved down the connecting road to Old Terminal as fast as they could, consistent with the appearance of a senior officer's entourage. On the approaches to the tarmac apron in front of the building, two Ugandan sentries faced the oncoming vehicles, aimed their carbines, and shouted an order to stop. There was no choice, and no time to argue. The first shots from the Mercedes were from pistols. One Ugandan fell and the other ran in the direction of the old control tower. The Ugandan on the ground was groping for his carbine. A paratrooper responded immediately with a burst. Muki and his team jumped from the car and ran the last 40 yards to the walkway in front of the building. The first entrance had been blocked off; without a second's pause, the paratroopers raced on to the second door.
After a searching debate with Yoni, Muki had decided to break a cardinal rule of the IDF. Junior officers usually lead the first wave of an assault, but Muki felt it important to be up front in case there was need to make decisions about changes in plans. Tearing along the walkway, he was fired on by a Ugandan. Muki responded, killing him. A terrorist stepped out the main door of the Old Terminal to see what the fuss was about, and rapidly returned the way he had come.
Muki then discovered that the magazine of his carbine was empty. The normal procedure would have been to step aside and let someone else take the lead. He decided against, and groped to change magazines on the run. The young officer behind him, realizing what was happening, came up alongside. The two of them, and one other trooper, reached the doorway together - Amnon, the young lieutenant, on the left, Muki in the center and the trooper on the right. The terrorist who had ventured out was now standing to the left of the door. Amnon fired, followed by Muki. Across the room, a terrorist rose to his feet and fired at the hostages sprawled around him, most of whom had been trying to sleep. Muki took care of him with two shots. Over to the right, a fourth member of the hijackers' team managed to loose off a burst at the intruders, but his bullets were high, hitting a window and showering glass into the room. The trooper aimed and fired. Meanwhile, Amnon identified the girl terrorist to the left of the doorway and fired. In the background, a bullhorn was booming in Hebrew and English: "This is the IDF! Stay down!" From a nearby mattress, a young man launched himself at the trio in the doorway, and was cut down by a carbine burst. The man was a bewildered hostage. Muki's troopers fanned out through the room and into the corridor to the washroom beyond - but all resistance was over.
The second assault team had meanwhile raced through another doorway into a hall where the off- duty terrorist spent their spare time.Two men in civilian clothes walked calmly towards them. Assuming that these could be hostages, the soldiers held their fire. Suddenly one of the men raised his hand and threw a grenade. The troopers dropped to the ground. A machine-gun burst eliminated their adversaries. The grenade exploded harmlessly. Yoni's third team from the Landrovers moved to silence any opposition from the Ugandan soldiers stationed near the windows on the floor above. On the way up the stairs, they met two soldiers, one of whom was fast on the trigger. The troopers killed them.
While his men circulated through the hall, calming the shocked hostages and tending the wounded, Muki was called out to the tarmac. There he found a doctor kneeling over Lt. Col. Yoni Netanyahu. Yoni had remained outside the building to supervise all three assault teams. A bullet from the top of the old control tower had hit him in the back. While the troopers silenced the fire from above, Yoni was dragged into the shelter of the overhanging wall by the walkway.
The assault on Old Terminal was completed within three minutes after the lead plane landed. Now in rapid succession, its three companions came into touch down at Entebbe. By 23:08 hours, all of Thunderball Force was on the ground. The runway lights shut down as the third plane came in to land, but it didn't matter, but it didn't matter - the beacons did the job well enough. With clockwork precision, armored personnel carriers roared off the ramp of the second transport to take up position to the front and rear of Old Terminal, while infantrymen from the first and third plane ran to secure all access to roads to the airport and to take over New Terminal and the control tower; the tower was vital for safe evacuation of the hostages and their rescuers. In a brief clash at the New Terminal, Sergeant Hershko Surin, who was due for demobilization from the army in twelve hours time fell wounded. The fourth plane taxied to a holding position near Old Terminal, ready to take on hostages. All the engines were left running. A team of Air Force technicians were already hard at work offloading heavy fuel pumps - hastily acquired by an inspired quartermaster one day earlier - and setting up to transfer Idi Amin's precious aviation fluid into the thirsty tanks of the lead transport - a process that would take well over an hour.
In Peres' crowded room in Tel Aviv, Kuti Adam's terse "Everything's okay" only served to heighten the tension. Motta Gur decided to contact Dan Shomron directly, but was little more enlightened by laconic "It's alright - I'm busy right now!"
The Medical Corps' Boeing had landed at Nairobi, in Kenya, at 22:25. IDF General Peled was now able to tell Lt. Col. S. that it was possible to refuel at Nairobi. Unable momentarily, to raise Shomron on the operational radio, and uncomfortable with the situation on the ground - the Ugandans were firing tracers at random, while the aircraft with engines running were vulnerable at the fuel tanks - Lt. Col. S. decided to take up the option now available.
Muki radioed Dan Shomron to report that the building and surroundings were secure - and to inform him that Yoni had been hit. Though they were ahead of schedule, there was no point in waiting (possibly allowing the Ugandans to bring up reinforcements), particularly since Shomron now knew that refueling the aircraft in Nairobi was possible. The fourth Hercules was ordered to move up closer to Old Terminal. Muki's men and the other soldiers around the building formed two lines from the doorway to the ramp of the plane; no chances would be taken that a bewildered hostage could wander off into the night - or blunder into the aircraft's engines. As the hostages straggled out, heads of families were stopped at the ramp and asked to check that all their kin were present. Captain Bacos was quietly requested to performed the same task for his "family"- the crew of Air France139. Behind them, Old Terminal was empty but for the bodies of six terrorists, among them a young European girl and a blond-haired German called Wilfried Boese.
It took seven minutes to load the precious cargo of humanity, while a pick-up truck - brought 2,200 miles specially for this purpose - ferried out the dead and wounded, including Yoni. The paratroops made a last check of the building, then signalled the aircrew to close up and go. At 23:52 hours, the craft was airborne and on its way to Nairobi, while doctors worked over seven wounded hostages, and the aircrew distributed sheets of aluminium foil to make up for an inadequate supply of blankets. It was cold, and the were exhausted and still in shock at the rapid change in their fortunes - and dimly aware that two of their number were dead, and that they were leaving behind an old lady, Mrs. Dora Bloch. She had been taken to a hospital in Kampala where she was subsequently murdered on Amins orders.
At the other end of the airfield, an infantry team fired machinegun bursts into seven Ugandan Air Force Migs. The decision to destroy the planes had just been relayed from Kuti Adams Boeing. There was no point in tempting Ugandan pilots into pursuit.
The paratroops reloaded their vehicles and equipment. Their job done, they were airborne at 00:12. Behind them, their comarades completed their tasks and checked that nothing was left behind - except the fuel pumps which were too much trouble to manhandle back on board a Hercules. The intention had been to leave the pick-up truck as a present for Idi Amin, but a soldier convinced one of the pilots too load that too. At 00:40, the last of Thunderball Force left Entebbe. Thirty minutes later, the second Boeinig and the first Hercules landed at Nairobi, and taxied to the fuel tanks in a quiet corner of the airport.
Though the pilots could not know it, Prime Minister Rabin had made a decision, on Friday morning, not to inform the Government of Kenya. Firstly there was security to consider and, secondly, he did not want to embarrass the Kenyans, who had enough troubles of their own with Idi Amin. Without any fuss, fuel tankers moved into position by the planes and began the refueling, while the drivers presented the paperwork to their pilots for signature - just as they would to any commercial flight. No questions were asked and no information volunteered. Sergeant Hershko who was seriously wounded, was transferred to the hospital Boeing. Two hostages whose wounds needed immediate care in a fully equipped hospital, were loaded into a waiting station wagon and taken into Nairobi, where one of them died. At four minutes past two on Sunday morning, the remaining passengers and aircrew of Air France 139 were airborne on the lastleg of their long journey home.
Long after midnight, the Spokesman of the Defense Ministry made a phone call to a sleeping household in Tel Aviv. The relatives of the hostages had elected a committee to pressure the Government, and the committee in turn had chosen a chairman who had met throughout the week with Rabin, Peres, Yaakobi and anyone else who would listen. This time, it was the chairman who was listening - though it took some moments for the news to jolt him awake.
The flight home was long, easy and uneventful - except for one nasty jolt! At 03:00, a Hercules pilot was twiddling the controls hoping for some music, when he heard the Israel Army Network announce:Israel Defense Forces tonight rescued... Why would they announce it before the planes reached home? He could not know that the Agence France Presse in Kampala had filed a wire story of shots heard in Entebbe, and it was already a headline on Paris radio and the BBC.
There was no mood of celebration on the transports. The hostages, huddled together against the cold, and aware now that their rescue had cost the life of a soldier, were thankful to be among their own again, but in no mood to join in the singsong that someone halfheartedly tried to start. They still needed time to absorb it all - to shake off the nightmare of Entebbe. In Lt. Col. S.s plane, the paratroops were sunk in their own private thoughts. Despite all efforts of the doctors,Yoni was dead. The mission was later renamed Operation Jonathan in his memory.
Early in the morning of Sunday, July 4, 1976 - by chance the day that Americans were celebrating their Bicentenial - the lead Hercules flew low over Eilat, at the southern tip of Israel. The tired airmen in the cockpit were astonished to see people in the streets below waving and clapping. The plane landed at an IDF Airforce Base in central Israel. The hostages were fed and given a chance to shake off the trauma. The wounded were taken off to hospital, and psychologists circulated among the others, giving help where it was needed.
In a remote corner of the same airfield, the three combat teams unloaded their vehicles and equipment. They would return to their bases, hardly aware of the excitement in Israel, and throughout the free world, over what they had done this night.
It was a mid-morning when a Hercules transport of the Israel Air Force touched down at Ben Gurion International Airport, rolled to a stop and opened its rear ramp to release its cargo of men, women and children into the the outstretched arms of their relatives and friends and of a crowd of thousands. The ordeal was over.
IDF - Eliminating the Iraqi Nuclear Threat
Although Iraq ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1969, there were clear indications that it had been striving to attain nuclear weapons for a long time.
On June 7, 1981, the Israel Defense Forces launched a surprise attack on Iraq's nuclear reactor in Osirak. This strike, lasting one minute and twenty seconds, was a significant setback for the Iraqi nuclear program.
In 1989, the U.S. intelligence community assumed that the Iraqi government was interested in achieving a nuclear explosives capability, based on evidence that Iraq was acquiring nuclear-related equipment and materials.
How close Iraq was to developing a bomb is open for debate. However, experts familiar with The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors, believe that Iraq could have produced a workable nuclear device in as little as six to 24 months, had they focused their efforts on a crash program to produce one.
The Iraqi nuclear program was massive, fiscally unconstrained, and was less vulnerable to destruction by precision bombing. During the Gulf War, the Iraqi nuclear facilities target list contained two sites, but after the war, inspectors operating under UNSCOM eventually uncovered more than twenty sites involved in the Iraqi nuclear program.
Iraqs nuclear weapons program suffered another very significant setback both from the Gulf War bombing of nuclear-related facilities and IAEA monitoring since the war.
All fissile material was removed from Iraq by the IAEA, but the expertise of scientists and technicians survived and possibly some documentation and infrastructure.
The U.N. Security Council, in Resolution 687 (1991) envisaged that within 15 days of adoption of the resolution, Iraq would submit to the Director General of the IAEA a declaration of the locations, amounts and types of nuclear related materials.
It was not possible, however, for the IAEA to follow such a timetable, as Iraq chose to follow a course of denial, concealment, and obstruction. The initial declarations provided by Iraq were totally inadequate and the IAEAs access to designated inspection sites was obstructed.
In recent years Iraq has stepped up its quest for nuclear weapons and has embarked on a worldwide hunt for materials to make an atomic bomb.
A report released
on September 9, 2002, by the International Institute for Strategic Studies,
an independent research organization, concluded that Saddam Hussein could
build a nuclear bomb within months if he were able to obtain fissile material.
Israel's first astronaut, a shooting star, Ilan Ramon
As the eyes of most
Israelis were glued to TV sets, with a thunderous and colorful roar, the
NASA Space Shuttle Columbia lifted off from Cape Canaveral on January
16, 2003 carrying Israel's first astronaut.
Ramon had been selected
by the IDF, the Israel Space Agency and NASA back in 1997 for this mission.
The STS-107 flight mission was delayed a few times for technical problems,
but on a beautiful, sun drenched day with combat aircraft circling the
Space Center to ensure security, it was a perfect liftoff.
"That was so moving, so touching," Ambassador Danny Ayalon said. "I was thinking the skies were colored blue and white our national colors. We had deep, beautiful blue skies and with this smoke [from the rocket boosters] coming out, it was very, very moving."
Once Columbia was safely settled in orbit, Mission Control radioed up "a big welcome to Ilan as you join the international community of human spaceflight."
Earlier in the morning, Ramon and his six crewmates rode to the pad under heavy police escort. A space center worker waved an Israeli flag as the "astrovan" passed in front of the launch control center. Despite the presence of a large SWAT team, the entire shuttle crew looked relaxed. Ramon waved and gave a thumbs-up.
For the next two weeks, the crew performed science around-the-clock. Technically, Ramon was considered an add-on passenger. But unlike most payload specialists, he will be participating in all of the experiments, because of the mission's heavy workload.
"When we were assigned to the flight, I started looking at the payloads, and it became obvious Ilan would have to be fully integrated with the crew," payload commander Mike Anderson explained. "Usually a payload specialist specializes in one payload, but we couldn't have that luxury on this flight. So Ilan is fully trained in all the payloads. He's going to everything that the other astronauts on the flight are doing."
The time line for a shuttle mission is dependent on when it launches, and nobody can tell ahead of time whether or not there will be launch delays. On long shuttle flights, each crew member gets two half days off. Ramon's time off was Wednesday, January 22 and and Tuesday, January 28.
The period after launch was extremely busy. First Ramon, Anderson, and Laurel Clark reconfigured the crew cabin. They folded and stored the chairs the crew used for launch and landing, and stored the bright orange launch and entry suits. Then two hours were spent activating the Spacehab module, in which most of the experiments will be performed.
Colonel Ramon described himself as a secular Jew but said he would try to observe the Sabbath while in space if it did not interfere with his duties. That raised the question of when the day of observance, normally from sundown Friday to sundown Saturday, occurred in earth orbit, since the shuttle circles the planet every 90 minutes. The astronaut consulted a group of rabbis, who developed a consensus that the day should be observed on the basis of times at his launching point, Cape Canaveral.
For Ramon's first meal in space he's selected kosher chicken and noodles, green beans with mushrooms, crackers, strawberries, trail mix, a brownie, and orange juice. Most food in space is similar to camping food precooked, freeze-dried servings. The astronaut injects several ounces of cold or hot water, waits a couple of minutes, then cuts the package open with scissors. Ramon's kosher chicken products are off-the-shelf. All he has to do is heat them in the oven and cut open the package. Most of the snack foods are standard.
After the meal half
of the crew pilot Willie McCool, Anderson, and Dave Brown went to sleep,
while Ramon, commander Rick Husband, and astronauts Clark and Kalpana
Chawla continued to set up the shuttle for its two weeks in space.
The crew will use that computer to send commands to move the cameras that will measure desert dust in the atmosphere to gauge its effect on climate change back and forth and operate the experiment's video recorders.
Then Ramon started his first science for the mission, a breathing experiment in which he pedaled a bicycle while breathing in and out of a tube. His breath was collected for scientists to analyze after the mission. Next Ramon set up the equipment which will be used for blood collections throughout the flight, and spit out a sample of saliva, which was placed into a 28-liter freezer. By the end of the mission, the freezer will be filled with saliva, blood, and urine samples from the crew.
Finally, after an extremely long day Ramon got to prepare for sleep. The astronauts who went to sleep after launch were awakened, and Ramon's shift briefed them on what it had accomplished and any problems encountered. Ramon was scheduled to climb into his sleeping bunk at 4:39 a.m. on Friday, Israel time, and get up at 12:39 p.m. for his second day in space.
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon spoke to Ramon on Wednesday. "I am very proud of the first Israeli astronaut. Congratulations to you and the whole crew,"Sharon said. "I wish you well and that you enjoy yourself and all return safely."
President Moshe Katsav sent a microfiche of the Bible the size of a credit card to Ramon to carry on his journey, Beit Hanassi said Tuesday.
Ramon is a soft-spoken
man conscious of the importance of symbols and history, and the role he
plays in both.
Ramon said earlier that he would take Jewish symbols or ritual objects with him that correspond to the timing of his particular mission.
"I'm going to carry special things and try to express something about the unity of the Israeli people and the Jewish community. I have some ideas,"Ramon said, "but for the time being, I will keep them deep inside of me. It will be a surprise."
One of the items Ramon carryed into space is a pencil drawing entitled "Moon Landscape." Created by a 14-year-old boy named Peter Ginz, it shows how Earth might look if you were on the Moon and looking back at our home world. What makes the drawing so important to Ramon is that it was created while Ginz was in a Nazi concentration camp, before the boy died in 1944.
Ramon, 48, is the son of Holocaust survivors.
"I know my flight is very symbolic for the people of Israel, especially the survivors, the Holocaust survivors,"said Ramon. "Because I was born in Israel, many people will see this as a dream that is come true."
The Israel Defense
Forces congratulated Colonel Ilan Ramon on a successful space launch.
Ilan, the IDF congratulates you and wishes you "a safe return home".
The tattered remains of an Israeli Air Force flag, for which Ramon carried into space, was found among debris in Texas
Col. Ramon sent the
following e-mail message 24 hours before the tragedy from the Columbia
to Israeli Air Force Commander Dan Halutz:
While Ramon is the first Israeli astronaut, there have been six previous astronauts from Jewish households Judy Resnik, Jeff Hoffman, Ellen Baker, Jay Apt, David Wolf, and Scott Horowitz. All have doctorates; Baker and Wolf are physicians. Horowitz was the first Jew to command a space mission. Israel is the 29th country to have one of its citizens in space.
In 1974, Ramon graduated as a fighter pilot from the Israel Air Force (IAF) Flight School. From 1974-1976 he participated in A-4 Basic Training and Operations. 1976-1980 was spent in Mirage III-C training and operations. In 1980, as one of the IAF's establishment team of the first F-16 Squadron in Israel, he attended the F-16 Training Course at Hill Air Force Base, Utah. From 1981-1983, he served as the Deputy Squadron Commander B, F-16 Squadron. From 1983-1987, he attended the University of Tel Aviv. From 1988-1990, he served as Deputy Squadron Commander A, F-4 Phantom Squadron. During 1990, he attended the Squadron Commanders Course. From 1990-1992, he served as Squadron Commander, F-16 Squadron. From 1992-1994, he was Head of the Aircraft Branch in the Operations Requirement Department. In 1994, he was promoted to the rank of Colonel and assigned as Head of the Department of Operational Requirement for Weapon Development and Acquisition. He stayed at this post until 1998.
Colonel Ramon had accumulated over 3,000 flight hours on the A-4, Mirage III-C, and F-4, and over 1,000 flight hours on the F-16.
In 1997, Colonel
Ramon was selected as a Payload Specialist. He is designated to train
as prime for a Space Shuttle mission with a payload that includes a multispectral
camera for recording desert aerosol. In July 1998, he reported for training
at the Johnson Space Center, Houston.
On February 1 the space shuttle Columbia disintegrated in the skies over Texas killing all seven crew members, including Israeli astronaut Ilan Ramon, just 16 minutes before its scheduled landing at the Kennedy Space Center in Florida.
The remains of Israeli astronaut Ilan Ramon have been found among the wreckage of the space shuttle Columbia and will be brought to Israel for burial, the Israeli army said Wednesday.
NASA officials informed representatives of the Israeli army that the body of Ramon had been identified, the army said in a statement. The remains will be brought to Israel for a funeral in the coming days.
"This is a relief to all of us, especially the family," said Brig. Gen. Rani Falk, an Israeli air force attache in Washington. "NASA informed us officially that Ilan Ramon, may his name be blessed, was identified, and we can bring him for burial in Israel in the coming days."
Astronaut, Colonel, Hero, Husband and Father Ilan Ramon Comes Home
Ramon's body was one of four sets of remains that have been positively identified, Israel Radio reported. The DNA and jaw bone of Ramon's body were checked to ensure that they were indeed his, the radio said.
Israel had sent four ultra-Orthodox specialists to aide NASA in searching for the remains of the astronauts, which were scattered near the Texas-Louisiana state line. According to Jewish law, all parts of a Jewish person must be buried. If the body is not found, a funeral is not possible.
On Sunday, NASA officials said there were at least three reports of body parts found in rural areas. Remains reportedly discovered in Texas include a skull, a torso, a thigh bone and a leg.
More human remains were found Tuesday, and a resident of Vernon Parish, La., found fabric bearing a blue Star of David on a silver background, according to the local sheriff. Israeli newspapers reported Wednesday that the cloth was from an Israeli air force flag that Ramon had taken with him.
The chief IDF chaplain, Brig. Gen. Yisrael Weiss, says that further astronauts' remains were recovered early today and that DNA tests are to determine whether any belong to Ilan Ramon.
Weiss spoke in an interview shortly after NASA officials confirmed that Ramon's remains had been recovered among wreckage of the Columbia in the southwestern US.
The rabbi also confirmed that the remains were indeed those of the Israeli astronaut. He said Ramon would be brought for a full military burial in Israel, but that a date has not yet been set due to the findings of additional remains some of which may also belong to Ramon.
"We know as of this morning that other remains have been found, we don't know whose they are. They have been sent for DNA exam and we shall know in another two days," Weiss said on Army Radio.
Weiss said that while he didn't want to use the word joy, "I certainly want to express tremendous satisfaction that Ilan Ramon is to brought to burial."
Looking at the Israeli
air force flag found along with Ramon's remains, Weiss said,"fill
me with such a deep Jewish and Israeli message.
Although he wasn't a religious Jew, the fact that he brought a Torah scroll into space and ate Kosher food on the shuttle, "sent a tremendous message to all of us, particularly in these times," when Israelis are so fragmented between the Orthodox and the secular, Weiss said.
As far as Halacha is concerned, Ramon can be buried as long as the smallest remains are found, but the family may want to wait to see if more are recovered, Weiss added. He said the US authorities also had some technical details to take care of before releasing the remains.
A Last "Thumbs-Ups"
- Col. Ilan Ramon
Col. Ilan Ramon is survived by his wife, Rona, their four children - Assaf (14), Tal (12), Yiftah (9) and Noa (5) - as well as his parents, Eliezer and Tova Wolferman, brother and sister.
Over the years, Israel has provided the most humanitarian aid it could to countries requiring assistance. The IDF has often been at the center of these humanitarian operations and has made an important contribution towards saving lives in foreign countries.
On September 19th and 20th, 1985, two fierce earthquakes shook Mexico's capital, Mexico City. The earthquakes left in their wake thousands of homes demolished, in which thousands of people lay trapped. In the wake of this disaster, it was decided that an Israel Defense Forces relief mission would be sent to Mexico City, along with tons of humanitarian equipment - medicines and tents, rescue equipment, professional rescue teams from the IDF's Rescue Unit and medical teams.
On December 7, 1988,
a powerful earthquake hit Armenia and destroyed many towns across the
entire country, leaving tens of thousands dead and injured, and many homeless.
Around the world humanitarian aid missions were assembled, and they assisted
the government of the USSR not only in rescuing and evacuating the injured,
but also in distributing basic supplies.
In the wake of the revolution in Romania, Israel dispatched to Bucharest a medical mission consisting of a team of surgeons. In addition, eight tons of food and medical equipment was sent in an IAF Hercules.
The IAF transported supplies to help earthquake victims in Georgia.
In the wake of the civil war in Yugoslavia, Israel assisted victims by sending food and medicines. On 18 August 1992, an IAF plane carried 13 tons of emergency supplies to Zagreb.
On March 17, 1992 a powerful bomb blast rocked the Israeli embassy building in Buenos Aires. The blast caused the collapse of the four-story building. Twenty-nine people were killed in the explosion and 250 were injured, many of them buried alive. Israel dispatched a Homefront Command rescue team and doctors, who were assisted by tracking dogs. The mission helped to extricate and thereby save the lives of many people buried under the collapsed building.
Bloody civil war broke out in Rwanda in 1994 between the Hutu and the Tutsi tribes. The fighting cost one million people their lives. As a result of the war, millions of refugees were concentrated in refugee camps in neighboring countries. On June 23 the Israel Defense Forces flew a medical team comprised of doctors, medical staff, medical supplies, food and clothing to assist the refugees concentrated in proximity to the city of Goma in Zaire. To ensure the security of the medical team, a unit of Givati Brigade soldiers was also sent. Some 270 IDF soldiers and officers spent 40 days in the field hospital at the refugee camp, and provided medical and humanitarian aid.
On July 4, 1997 a huge fire broke out in a number of Turkish arms factories. The Turkish government turned to the Israel Air Force and asked for assistance in putting it out. The IAF sent assistance in the form of fire-fighting helicopters and sophisticated equipment. With the Israeli aid, Turkish efforts to put out the fire, which was threatening to engulf the adjacent city, were successful. The IAF received much praise for the successful aid.
On the morning of 7 August 1998, powerful blasts rocked the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es-Salaam, Tanzania. In Nairobi, the blast took a toll of over 100 dead and thousands of wounded. When the extent of the tragedy in Nairobi became known, IDF Chief-of-Staff, Lt. Gen. Shaul Mofaz ordered the IDF to dispatch Israel Air Force planes with an IDF rescue mission to the Kenyan capital. The rescue mission included the experienced Homefront Command Search and Rescue Unit (equipped with sophisticated materiel and a canine unit), and Medical Corps teams comprised of physicians and medics specializing in traumatology, medical equipment and blood. The mission was headed by the Homefront Command Chief-of-Staff. Immediately upon their arrival in Nairobi on 8 August, the IDF mission began to undertake a SAR operation in coordination with the Kenyan and US forces operating at the site of the explosion. The Israeli team immediately located a number of trapped survivors and began operations to extricate them.
Early Tuesday Morning
(6 April), the Israel Defense Forces dispatched a field hospital, under
IDF Medical Corps Command , to assist Albanian refugees from Kosovo.
In January of 2001 in India Operation Helping Hand was put into place. The IDF medical reliefe delegation began its activities at the town of Bouj and opened a field hospital to give medical aid to the residents of the area.
The Mission of the IDF
The Mission of the Israel Defense Forces is to defend the existence and territorial sovereignty of the state of Israel.
To protect the inhabitants of Israel and to combat all forms of terrorism which threaten daily life.
The State of Israel has always and a single defense goal - to ensure the existence of israel and the security of its citizens. Israel's defense policy has been, therefore, to maintain a strong deterrent capacity to dissuade potential enemies from attacking,
Israel's security doctrine dictates that Israel cannot lose a single war. If war breaks out, Israel must defeat the enemy quickly and decisively. Since it lacks strategic depth, Israel must prevent the enemy from entering its territory, and must try to quickly transfer the battle to enemy territory.
There has always been a basic asymmetry between Israel and its Arab neighbors.Israel covers a tiny area on the map compared with its neighbors.
Israel's population is also very small so it has never been able to amass a large army, certainly nothing near the size of that of a large Arab state. equipped to cope with immediate security needs.It relies heavily on its reserve forces and in time of war, most of the population is called up. To make up for this quantitative disadvantage, it is essential that Israel maintain as large a qualitative lead as possible. The IDF makes up for its lack of size by superior maneuverability and fire power, and by relying on intelligence.
Israel can only maintain a standing force.
The IDF concetrates its main efforts in these areas maintaining preparedness for war; continously building its armed forces, introducing the latest technology and state-of-the-art weapons systems; fighting terrorism .
Israel's war against terrorism includes detecting Palestinian child bombers.
The Israel Defense
Forces was formed in the throes of war with the establishment of the state
half a century ago. And in the course of its short fifty years, Israel
was forced into wars most reckoned it could not survive. But the IDF came
out victorious. It fought boldly against Arab armies who wanted to destroy
the state, and won against overwhelming odds.
The Israel Defense Forces are the state of Israel's military force. The IDF is subordinate to the directions of the democratic civilian authorities and the laws of the state. The goal of the IDF is to protect the existence of the State of Israel and her independence, and to thwart all enemy efforts to disrupt the normal way of life in Israel.
IDF soldiers are obligated to fight, to dedicate all their strength and even sacrifice their lives in order to protect the State of Israel, her citizens and residents. IDF soldiers will operate according to the IDF values and orders, while adhering to the laws of the state and norms of human dignity, and honoring the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.
The Spirit of the IDF is the identity card of the IDF values, which should stand as the foundation of all of the activities of every IDF soldier, on regular or reserve duty.
The Spirit of the Israel Defense Forces and the guidelines of operation resulting from it are the ethical code of the IDF. The Spirit of the IDF will be applied by the IDF, its soldiers, its officers, its units and corps to shape their mode of action. They will behave, educate and evaluate themselves and others according to the Spirit of the IDF.
The Spirit of the Israel Defense Forces draws on four sources:The tradition of the IDF and its military heritage as the Israel Defense Forces.
The tradition of the State of Israel, its democratic principles, laws and institutions.
The tradition of the Jewish People throughout their history.
Universal moral values based on the value and dignity of human life.
Defense of the State, its Citizens and its Residents - The IDF's goal is to defend the existence of the State of Israel, its independence and the security of the citizens and residents of the state.
At the core of service in the Israel Defense Forces stand the love of the homeland and the commitment and devotion to the State of Israel-a democratic state that serves as a national home for the Jewish People-its citizens and residents.
The IDF and its soldiers are obligated to protect human dignity. Every human being is of value regardless of his or her origin, religion, nationality, gender, status or position.
Tenacity of Purpose in Performing Missions and Drive to Victory - The IDF servicemen and women will fight and conduct themselves with courage in the face of all dangers and obstacles; They will persevere in their missions resolutely and thoughtfully even to the point of endangering their lives.
The Israel Defense Forces serviceman or woman will see themselves as active participants in the defense of the state, its citizens and residents. They will carry out their duties at all times with initiative, involvement and diligence with common sense and within the framework of their authority, while prepared to bear responsibility for their conduct.
The IDF servicemen and women shall present things objectively, completely and precisely, in planning, performing and reporting. They will act in such a manner that their peers and commanders can rely upon them in performing their tasks.
The IDF servicemen and women will comport themselves as required of them, and will demand of themselves as they demand of others, out of recognition of their ability and responsibility within the military and without to serve as a deserving role model.
The Israel Defense Forces servicemen and women will act in a judicious and safe manner in all they do, out of recognition of the supreme value of human life. During combat they will endanger themselves and their comrades only to the extent required to carry out their mission.
The IDF servicemen and women will use their weapons and force only for the purpose of their mission, only to the necessary extent and will maintain their humanity even during combat. IDF soldiers will not use their weapons and force to harm human beings who are not combatants or prisoners of war, and will do all in their power to avoid causing harm to their lives, bodies, dignity and property.
The Israel Defense Forces servicemen and women will acquire the professional knowledge and skills required to perform their tasks, and will implement them while striving continuously to perfect their personal and collective achievements.
The IDF servicemen and women will strive to the best of their ability to fully and successfully complete all that is required of them according to orders and their spirit. IDF soldiers will be meticulous in giving only lawful orders, and shall refrain from obeying blatantly illegal orders.
The IDF servicemen and women will act out of fraternity and devotion to their comrades, and will always go to their assistance when they need their help or depend on them, despite any danger or difficulty, even to the point of risking their lives.
The Israel Defense Forces soldiers view their service in the IDF as a mission. They will be ready to give their all in order to defend the state, its citizens and residents. This is due to the fact that they are representatives of the IDF who act on the basis and in the framework of the authority given to them in accordance with IDF orders.
(With copy from the IDF Website)
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