Gaza
in The Dark While Israel PR Lacks Candles
By
Joel Leyden
Israel News Agency
Jerusalem, Israel ----- January 25, 2008 ....... The following
is an excellent analysis and SEO news story by Amir Mizroch
of the Jerusalem Post as to why and how Israel PR suffers.
Inserted into this story are comments made by this writer who
has worked in professional public relations and crisis communications
management for over 25 years.
As
the clock struck 8 p.m. this past Sunday night, prime time in
the Middle East, Israel and Europe for TV news broadcasts, the
Al Jazeera satellite TV network opened its top-of-the-hour news
bulletin with a live scene from Gaza City. The footage was powerful
and unforgettable: thousands of people gathered to light candles
in a Gaza City plunged into darkness. The possibility that the
Hamas PR machine itself had switched off the lights in the densely
populated city to create the impression of an urgent humanitarian
crisis was likely not considered by many watching the broadcast.
Also
what was not considered and immediately aired by Israel PR government
staff was the question as to how could Al Jazeera broadcast
if there was no electricity? Where did those candles come from?
Who organized this demonstration and how much were they being
paid? Why wasn't this information getting out?
The
Israel decision over the weekend to reduce shipments of industrial
diesel fuel to the Gaza power station, still fresh in the minds
of worldwide viewers, was presumably seen overwhelmingly as
the cause of the outage. Never mind the fact that Israel's Ruttenberg
power station in Ashkelon was still streaming electricity into
Gaza and that there had been no Israel action that shut the
city's lights off. Never mind the fact that the sun began setting
over Gaza by 6 p.m., and that the Strip had been totally dark
for over an hour before the central news shows began at 8 p.m.
The lights in Gaza were shut off sometime between 7 p.m. and
8 p.m. and a candlelight protest was organized.
Someone
from the Israel government PR machine could have guessed that
Israel's Ruttenberg power station in Ashkelon had been hit by
a Kassam - as Ashkelon has been and continues to be a target
of Kassam rockets. Would Israel be lying? Maybe or perhaps stretching.
Israel could have called it a "miscommunication".
The Mossad effectively lies all the time. So does Hamas. Remember
the words of Mark Twain: "A lie can travel halfway around
the world while the truth is putting on its shoes." And
that statement was made before there was Internet!
The
Arab Qatari satellite channel was not the only one to broadcast
a live feed from Gaza that night. "Gaza in Darkness"
was also the headline above the opening shot of both major Israel
TV news broadcasts at 8 p.m. - with both Channels 2 and 10 showing
wide-angle shots of a dark Gaza City.
Why
was Israel TV playing into the hands of the enemy? The candle
show in Gaza served only one purpose - to incite world public
opinion against Israel. Israel government TV should have been
ordered not to air any Gaza images and it would have been suggested
to private and commercial Israel TV channel 2 that it was against
Israel's interest. Israel would not and should not ever order
censorship, but as a family we should work together for our
defense and security.
Meanwhile,
in Jerusalem, the Israel Foreign Ministry's public diplomacy
team was frantically trying to get its own "money shot."
In the absence of Kassam (Qassam) rockets landing in Sderot
(Hamas had stopped firing at Sderot so the Palestinians would
be in sole possession of the visual narrative), the team was
hoping to send a TV crew out to the Ashkelon, Israel power plant
to show that Israel had not shut down power to Gaza. "We
even thought of putting a big 'Gaza' sign on one of the main
switches, and show how [the switch] was still up," says
one of the ministry's PR men.
Why
was this only a passing thought? That sign should have been
created and still be hanging by the buttons and switches.
What
happened next is a classic example not only of Israel bureaucratic
buffoonery, but a sad indication that not much has been learned
and implemented since the Second Lebanon War exposed how dire
the need is for a unified communications apparatus as a tool
in fighting modern wars.
Ilan
Shtulman, a Foreign Ministry public diplomacy official, was
frantically working the phones to try get permission for a Foreign
Ministry camera crew to film at the Ruttenberg power plant.
Shtulman called up the Israel Electric Corporation to get the
OK, but the IEC said it couldn't authorize the plan and referred
Shtulman to the National Infrastructures Ministry, which has
authority over power stations. Shtulman called up the infrastructures
people, who said they couldn't grant permission and suggested
he call the Defense Ministry, as Ruttenberg is also classified
as a strategic installation.
Meanwhile,
the worldwide media clock was ticking and images of Palestinian
children holding candles and huddling together for warmth and
comfort were ruling the airwaves. Shtulman called up the Defense
Ministry, and four hours after the first call was made to the
electric company, the Foreign Ministry finally got approval
to send a TV crew to the power plant to film evidence that Israel
hadn't turned off the switch and that the Gaza blackout had
a different source. Too late - the Gaza "money shot"
was all over the place, even on YouTube.
The
Israel Foreign Ministry should be given the authority by the
Prime Minister's Office to take action as needed. The Ministry
should consult and listen to all sides, but not await authority
by any other government authority to get out images critical
to Israel's survival.
This
week's events surrounding the Gaza power outages and the way
they were manipulated by both sides make for a telling case
study in public diplomacy, public relations or public affairs
known in Hebrew as "hasbara."
First,
it was a "short fight," as an Israel Foreign Ministry
official put it, taking place between Sunday evening and Tuesday
morning. And the Foreign Ministry PR people insist Israel didn't
lose.
But
they did lose. And they should have openly blamed the Prime
Ministers Office for such a failure as per the Israel government's
decision of July 2007 to establish a National Communications
Authority under the auspices of the Prime Minister's Office.
"The
Foreign Ministry explains government decisions, it doesn't make
them. How can they expect us to effectively explain government
policy if we're not part of the decision-making process, if
we're out of the loop?" a hasbara official says.
What
is lacking, other hasbara officials say, is interagency cooperation,
a malady well known in these parts and already addressed at
length in the interim Winograd Report, the Foreign Affairs and
Defense Committee report prepared by MK Amira Dotan, and the
State Comptroller's Report on the Second Lebanon War.
The
Israel Foreign Ministry was not given prior warning of the measures
to be executed against Gaza on Sunday morning. The ministry's
PR team first learned about Israel's reduction in the supply
of industrial diesel to Hamas-controlled Gaza through the local
media. The PR team then contacted Defense Ministry officials
for more information, as calls from foreign correspondents were
starting to stream in.
The
Defense Ministry had made no decision to prepare the Foreign
Ministry for the possible (read: expected) media frenzy that
was sure to follow the Israel action. The Defense Ministry,
staffed by hardened ex-generals and other security men, does
not put much stock in hasbara, seeing guns and mortars as much
more influential than images and sound bites.
The
Israel Defense Ministry failed here. Hardened generals should
know that it is mostly public opinion that creates wars and
public opinion which decides who will win. It is the spirit
of public opinion that supports morale in the IDF, to hold the
Israeli flag high. The Bush Administration spent months preparing
the American public for the Iraq war. Israel did not spend one
minute preparing its public and the global community for reaction
and support.
Aryeh
Mekel, former Israel Consul in New York and now the Foreign
Ministry's spokesman for the foreign press, began formulating
a response and speaking to the international media on Sunday
evening. He started with the major wire services: AP, Reuters
and AFP. The message: The diesel reduction had nothing to do
with the outage in Gaza City, as Gaza gets 70 percent of its
electricity from Israeli power lines and those were still sending
power through; the Defense Ministry was convinced that Hamas
was faking the scene of a darkened Gaza City (why was Gaza City
blacked out? Because that's where the lights are concentrated
- black out Gaza City and people will see it for miles.)
The
Foreign Ministry team started refining its message using precise
wording: Hamas was fabricating the power outage; the outage
and the candlelight protest were staged productions; Mekel even
came up with the term "Blackfest" (not to be confused
with an African American music and culture festival of the same
name).
Next,
Mekel and his team made sure that all 97 of Israel's embassies
and consulates scattered across the globe received a document
containing the messages the Jerusalem team had formulated. But
it was Sunday, and in most countries, offices were closed.
Offices
may be closed but someone has their home and mobile telephone
numbers. No different than an IDF Tzav 8 - an emergency IDF
order to report to base. Israel's governmental PR people around
the world need to work with the same system that the IDF has
to inform in real time each and every reservist to report to
duty.
On
this point the Foreign Ministry failed.
By
the time the embassy staff walked into their offices on Monday
morning, they would have a document with talking points ready
for them. But in the intervening 12 hours, the images of the
candlelight protest and darkened Gaza City, both in video footage
and photo stills, were left unchallenged on all major TV networks,
news Web sites, Internet forums and Monday's newspapers - including
Israel ones.
Next,
the Foreign Ministry began putting out the word that Israel
saw "several signs" that there may have been some
coordination between the Arab satellite news TV stations and
Hamas in Gaza. (Al Jazeera denies the charge.) The Israel message:
How was it possible for Al Jazeera to open its 8 p.m. newscast
with a scene depicting the candlelight protest? How did it know
where and when the "spontaneous" protest would be?
How did it happen to have guests in place in the studios ready
to give reactions to something that was supposedly unplanned?"
Al Jazeera says its correspondents are on the ground in Gaza
and are able to report very quickly on anything that happens.
Al
Jazeera does not report the news. They are nothing less than
a propaganda machine which incites the Arab world to violence.
They should not be working in Israel. They should not have Israel
Government Press Cards!
What
is obvious is that Hamas was thinking on its feet, being proactive,
initiating campaigns tailor-made for powerful media images and
taking full advantage of the opportunities that presented themselves.
Hamas knew that as of Sunday morning, Israel was reducing the
amount of industrial diesel being shipped to the Gaza Strip.
Hamas also knew that the industrial diesel being withheld would
not have an immediate effect on the flow of electricity into
Gaza. It would take several days for the Gaza power station
to run out of diesel and switch off power in Gaza City - but
these facts were easily glossed over with images of human suffering.
The
Israel Foreign Ministry believes that Hamas choreographed both
the candlelight protest and the blackout in Gaza, and is looking
to prove it.
By
Monday morning, Mekel had refined his message and was hitting
the airwaves everywhere - APTN, Reuters, CNN and others - creating
the all-important sound bites that are beamed across the globe
and repeated in loops. The latest message: Hamas is faking it,
it's a staged production; Israel didn't cut off electricity
to Gaza and won't allow a humanitarian crisis to develop there.
By
Monday night, largely because of pressure on Israel to relax
its restrictions - pressure that was the result of the media
images out of Gaza - the Defense Ministry decided to renew fuel
and supplies to Gaza. But once again, it failed to notify the
Foreign Ministry PR team, which learned about the move on the
radio.
The
Israel Defense Ministry failed here for a second time.
Only
after getting the information from the Defense Ministry did
the Israel PR hasbara team have enough "ammunition"
to start playing up Israel's humanitarian gestures. Israel would
send 2.2 million liters of industrial diesel through to Gaza,
as well as 50 trucks loaded with humanitarian aid, cooking gas
and medicine. Once Mekel got his hands on these numbers, he
went straight to the wires, which led to reduced media pressure
and Tuesday morning's headline in the New York Times and on
the front page of the International Herald Tribune: "Israelis
to ease blockade of Gaza."
By
Tuesday morning, the Foreign Ministry was saying openly that
the fact that almost no rockets had been fired at Sderot on
Sunday and Monday showed that, in fact, Hamas controlled the
flames of escalation. The subtext of Israel's message, one its
spokespeople could not voice in their own names: "We are
letting diesel and humanitarian aid through just this once,
but we're keeping our eyes on the situation. Should the rocket
attacks start again, well, the Palestinians saw what we can
do, what we're capable of. But in any case, we don't want a
humanitarian crisis."
Why
was there not one spokesperson from the Foreign Ministry working
in Sderot?
Why did Israel fail to place the spotlight on the suffering
of the citizens of Sderot? Why was it that only David Saranga
and the Consul in New York who were proactive in placing red
balloons representing Kassam missiles in front of the UN. Why
were there no Kassam victims from Sderot or Ashkelon speaking
to the global media from Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, London, Paris
and New York?
Speaking
to the The Jerusalem Post Tuesday evening, Mekel's voice
sounded a bit hoarse, and he had a light cough. Mekel did a
lot of talking Sunday through Tuesday, conveying the messages
he was largely responsible for constructing. He spoke at least
once to almost every large foreign media outlet in the first
24 hours of the crisis. But, as even he admits, Israel was reacting
to the message of the initial blackout images and the story
of Israel's "culpability" in darkening Gaza that had
ruled the airwaves since Sunday night. Trying his best to undermine
the power of those images, Mekel was fighting a valiant but
uphill battle.
Mekel
could have used a heads-up from the Defense Ministry, a few
hours' advance warning that would have allowed him to prepare
reactions for possible scenarios. It could have been assumed
that Hamas would want to exploit the situation. Israel passed
up an opportunity to shape the message, instead handing the
narrative over to Hamas. The group quickly pounced on the opportunity
to show the world how Israel was causing a humanitarian situation
in Gaza through its sanctions - even if there was no direct
link - by shutting off the lights in Gaza and organizing a "spontaneous,"
peaceful candlelight protest.
In
the final analysis, there has been only limited progress on
integrating Israel public diplomacy interests in the big decision-making
picture, despite the recent findings of several committees that
this lack of coordination damages Israel's ability to attain
strategic goals. The Israel government's decision of July 2007
to establish a National Communications Authority under the auspices
of the Prime Minister's Office remains just that: a decision,
without any operable, tangible measures undertaken.
Ehud
Olmert and his staff failed on this point. Perhaps they took
a cue from Ariel Sharon who also promised to resolve this PR
communications problem. Sharon's only action was to create a
committee which went nowhere fast.
As
long as Israel only has a "decision" we can only blame
ourselves for Israel's lack of professional public relations
and public affairs activity. And lacking proper, effective PR
has a direct and immediate effect on Israel's political and
economic survival. It has a direct effect on the lives of each
and every family in Israel and the lives of our soldiers who
serve bravely on the front lines from Metulla to Eilat.
Israel's
citizens and soldiers deserve better.