The
Winograd Report
Communicated by the Israel Ministry for Foreign
Affairs and the Israel Government Press Office
On Monday, April 30, the Inquiry Commission into
the military campaign held in Lebanon in summer
2006, headed by former Justice Dr. Eliyahu Winograd,
submitted to the Prime Minister and Minister of
Defense an interim report relating to the time from
the IDF's exit from Lebanon to the soldiers' abduction
on July 12, 2006 and to the time between July 12
and July 17, when the decision to move into war
was taken.
1. On September 17th 2006, the Government of Israel
decided, under section 8A of Basic Law:
The Government 2001, to appoint a governmental commission
of examination "To look into the preparation
and conduct of the political and the security levels
concerning all the dimensions of the Northern Campaign
which started on July 12th 2006". Today we
have submitted to the Prime Minister and the Minister
of Defence the classified interim report, and we
are now presenting the unclassified report to the
public.
2. The Commission was appointed due to a strong
sense of a crisis and deep disappointment with the
consequences of the campaign and the way it was
conducted. We regarded accepted this difficult task
both as a duty and a privilege. It is our belief
that the larger the event and the deeper the feeling
of crisis - the greater the opportunity to change
and improve matters which are essential for the
security and the flourishing of state and society
in Israel. We believe Israeli society has great
strength and resilience, with a robust sense of
the justice of its being and of its achievements.
These, too, were expressed during the war in Lebanon
and after it. At the same time, we must not underrated
deep failures among us.
3. This conception of our role affected the way
we operated. No-one underestimates the need to study
what happened in the past, including the imposition
of personal responsibility. The past is the key
for learning lessons for the future. Nonetheless,
learning these lessons and actually implementing
them are the most implication of the conclusions
of the Commission.
4. This emphasis on learning lessons does not only
follow from our conception of the role of a public
Commission. It also follows from our belief that
one Israeli society greatest sources of strength
is its being a free, open and creative. Together
with great achievements, the challenges facing it
are existential. To cope with them, Israel must
be a learning society - a society which examines
its achievements and, in particular, its failures,
in order to improve its ability to face the future.
5. Initially we hoped that the appointment of the
Commission will serve as an incentive to accelerate
learning processes in the relevant systems, while
we are working, so that we could devote our time
to study all of the materials in depth, and present
the public with a comprehensive picture. However,
learning processes have been limited. In some ways
an opposite, and worrying, process emerged - a process
of waiting for the Commissions
Report before energetic and determined action is
taken to redress failures which have been revealed.
6. Therefore we decided to publish initially an
Interim Report, focusing on the decisions related
to starting the war. We do this in the hope that
the relevant bodies will act urgently to change
and correct all that it implies. We would like to
reiterate and emphasize that we hope that this Partial
Report, which concentrates on the functioning of
the highest political and military echelons in their
decision to move into the war will not divert attention
from the overall troubling complete picture revealed
by the war as a whole.
7. The interim report includes a numer of chapters
dealing with the following subjects:
a. The Commissions conception of its role,
and its attitude to recommendations in general and
to recommendations dealing with specific persons
in particular. (chapter 2): We see as the main task
of a public commission of inquiry (or investigation)
to determine findings and conclusions, and present
them- with its recommendations - before the public
and decision makers so that they can take action.
A public commission should not - in most cases -
replace the usual political decision-making processes
and determine who should serve as a minister or
senior military commander. Accordingly, we include
personal conclusions in the interim report, without
personal recommendations. However, we will reconsider
this matter towards our Final Report in view of
the depiction of the war as a whole.
b. The way we balanced our desire to engage in
a speedy and efficient investigation with the rights
of those who may be negatively affected to natural
justice (chapter 3): The special stipulations
of the Commissions of Inquiry Act in this regard
do not apply to a governmental commission of Examination,
but we regard ourselves, naturally, as working under
the general principles of natural justice. The commission
notified those who may be affected by its investigation,
in detailed letters of invitation, of the ways in
which they may be negatively affected, and enabled
them to respond to allegations against them, without
sending "notices of warning" and holding
a quasi-judicial hearing before reaching out conclusions.
We believe that in this way we provided all who
may be negatively affected by our report with a
full opportunity to answer all allegations against
them.
c. The processes and developments in the period
between the withdrawal of the IDF from Lebanon until
July 11, 2006 which contributed to the background
of the Lebanon War (Chapter 4): These processes
created much of the factual background against which
the decision-makers had to operate on July 12th,
and they are thus essential to both the understanding
and the evaluation of the events of the war. Understanding
them is also essential for drawing lessons from
the events, whose significance is often broader
than that of the war itself.
8. The core of the interim report is a detailed
examination of the decisions of senior political
and military decision-makers concerning the decision
to go to war at the wake of the abduction of the
two soldiers on the morning of July 12th. We start
with the decision of the government on the fateful
evening of the 12th to authorize a sharp military
response, and end with the speech of the Prime Minister
in the Knesset on July 17th, when he officially
presented the campaign and its goals. These decisions
were critical and constitutive, and therefore deserve
separate investigation. We should note that these
decisions enjoyed broad support within the government,
the Knesset and the public throughout this period.
9. Despite this broad support, we determine that
there are very serious failings in these decisions
and the way they were made. We impose the primary
responsibility for these failures on the Prime Minister,
the minister of defence and the (outgoing) Chief
of Staff. All three made a decisive personal contribution
to these decisions and the way in which they were
made. Howwever,, there are many others who share
responsibility for the mistakes we found in these
decisions and for their background conditions.
10. The main failures in the decisions made and
the decision-making processes can be summed up as
follows:
a. The decision to respond with an immediate,
intensive military strike was not based on a detailed,
comprehensive and authorized military plan, based
on carefull study of the complex characteristics
of the Lebanon arena. A meticulous examination of
these characteristics would have revealed the following:
the ability to achieve military gains having significant
political-international weight was limited; an Israeli
military strike would inevitably lead to missiles
fired at the Israeli civilian north; there was not
other effective military response to such missile
attacks than an extensive and prolonged ground operation
to capture the areas from which the missiles were
fired - which would have a high cost
and which did not enjoy broad support. These difficulties
were not explicitly raised with the political leaders
before the decision to strike was taken.
b. Consequently, in making the decision to go
to war, the government did not consider the whole
range of options, including that of continuing the
policy of containment, or combining
political and diplomatic moves with military strikes
below the escalation level, or military
preparations without immediage military action -
so as to maintain for Israel the full range of responses
to the abduction. This failure reflects weakness
in strategic thinking, which derives the response
to the event from a more comprehensive and encompassing
picture.
c. The support in the cabinet for this move was
gained in part through ambiguity in the presentation
of goals and modes of operation, so that ministers
with different or even contradictory attitudes could
support it. The ministers voted for a vague decision,
without understanding and knowing its nature and
implications. They authorized to commence a military
campaign without considering how to exit it.
d. Some of the declared goals of the war were
not clear and could not be achieved, and in part
were not achieveable by the authorized modes of
military action.
e. The IDF did not exhibit creativity in proposing
alternative action possibilities, did not alert
the political decision-makers to the discrepancy
between its own scenarios and the authorized modes
of action, and did not demand - as was necessary
under its own plans - early mobilization of the
reserves so they could be equipped and trained in
case a ground operation would be required.
f. Even after these facts became known to the
political leaders, they failed to adapt the military
way of operation and its goals to the reality on
the ground. On the contrary, declared goals were
too ambitious, and it was publicly states that fighting
will continue till they are achieved. But the authorized
military operations did not enable their achievement.
11. The primary responsibility for these serious
failings rests with the Prime Minister, the minister
of defense and the (outgoing) Chief of Staff. We
single out these three because it is likely that
had any of them acted better - the decisions in
the relevant period and the ways they were made,
as well as the outcome of the war, would have been
significantly better.
12. Let us start with the Prime Minister.
a. The Prime Minister bears supreme and comprehensive
responsibility for the decisions of his
government and the operations of the army. His responsibility
for the failures in the initial decisions concerning
the war stem from both his position and from his
behavior, as he initiated and led the decisions
which were taken.
b. The Prime Minister made up his mind hastily,
despite the fact that no detailed military plan
was submitted to him and without asking for one.
Also, his decision was made without close study
of the complex features of the Lebanon front and
of the military, political and diplomatic options
available to Israel. He made his decision without
systematic consultation with others, especially
outside the the IDF, despite not having experience
in external-political and military affairs. In addition,
he did not adequately consider political and professional
reservations presented to him before the fateful
decisions of July 12th.
c. The Prime Minister is responsible for the fact
that the goals of the campaign were not set out
clearly and carefully, and that there was no serious
discussion of the relationships between these goals
and the authorized modes of military action. He
nade a personal contribution to the fact that the
declared goals were over-ambitious and not feasible.
d. The Prime Minister did not adapt his plans
once it became clear that the assumptions and expectations
of Israels actions were not realistic and
were not materializing.
e. All of these add up to a serious failure in
exercising judgment, responsibility and prudence.
13. The Minister of Defence is the minister responsible
for overseeing the IDF, and he is a senior member
in the group of leaders in charge of political-military
affairs.
a. The Minister of Defence did not have knowledge
or experience in military, political or governmental
matters. He also did not have good knowledge of
the basic principles of using military force to
achieve political goals.
b. Despite these serious gaps, he made his decisions
during this period without systemic consultations
with experienced political and professional experts,
including outside the security establishment. In
addition, he did not give adequate weight to reservations
expressed in the meetings he attended.
c. The Minister of Defence did not act within
a strategic conception of the systems he oversaw.
He did not ask for the IDFs operational plans
and did not examine them; he did not check the preparedness
and fitness of IDF; and did not examine the fit
between the goals set and the modes of action presented
and authorized for achieving them. His influence
on the decisions made was mainly pointillist and
operational. He did not put on the table - and did
not demand presentation - of serious strategic options
for discussion with the Prime Minister and the IDF.
d. The Minister of Defence did not develop an
independent assessment of the implications of the
complexity of the front for Israels proper
response, the goals of the campaign, and the relations
between military and diplomatic moves within it.
His lack of experience and knowledge prevented him
from challenging in a competent way both the IDF,
over which he was in charge, and the Prime Minister.
e. In all these ways, the Minister of Defence
failed in fulfilling his functions. Therefore, his
serving as Minister of Defence during the war impaired
Israels ability to respond well to its challenges.
14. The Chief of Staff (COS) is the supreme commander
of the IDF, and the main source of information concerning
the army, its plans, abilities and recommendations
presented to the political echelon. Furthermore,
the COSs personal involvement with decision
making within the army and in coordination with
the political echelon were dominant.
a. The army and the COS were not prepared for
the event of the abduction despite recurring alerts.
When the abduction happened, he responded impulsively.
He did not alert the political leaders to the complexity
of the situation, and did not present information,
assessments and plans that were available in the
IDF at various levels of planning and approval and
which would have enabled a better response to the
challenges.
b. Among other things, the COS did not alert the
political echelon to the serious shortcomings in
the preparedness and the fitness of the armed forces
for an extensive ground operation, if that became
necessary. In addition, he did not clarify that
the military assessments and analyses of the arena
were that a military strike against Hezbollah will
with a high probability make such a move necessary.
c. The COSs responsibility is aggravated
by the fact that he knew well that both the Prime
Minister and the Minister of Defense lacked adequate
knowledge and experience in these matters, and by
the fact that he had led them to believe that the
IDF was ready and prepared and had operational plans
fitting the situation.
d. The COS did not provide adequate responses
to serious reservation about his recommendations
raised by ministers and others during the first
days of the campaign, and he did not present to
the political leaders the internal debates within
the IDF concerning the fit between the stated goals
and the authorized modes of actions.
e. In all these the Chief of Staff failed in his
duties as commander in chief of the army and as
a critical part of the political-military leadership,
and exhibited flaws in professionalism, responsibility
and judgment.
15. Concomitantly we determine that the failures
listed here, and in the outcomes of the war, had
many other partners.
a. The complexity of the Lebanon scene is basically
outside Israels control.
b. The ability of Hezbollah to sit on the
border, its ability to dictate the moment
of escalation, and the growth of its military abilities
and missile arsenal increased significantly as a
result of Israels unilateral withdrawal in
May 2000 (which was not followed, as had been hoped,
by The Lebanese Army deploying on the border with
Israel.
c. The shortcomings in the preparedness and the
training of the army, its operational doctrine,
and various flaws in its organizational culture
and structure, were all the responsibility of the
military commanders and political leaders in charge
years before the present Prime Minister, Minister
of Defense and Chief of Staff took office.
d. On the political-security strategic level,
the lack of preparedness was also caused by the
failure to update and fully articulate Israels
security strategy doctrine, in the fullest sense
of that term, so that it could not serve as a basis
for coping comprehensively will all the challenges
facing Israel. Responsibility for this lack of an
updates national security strategy lies with Israels
governments over the years. This omission made it
difficult to devise an immediate proper response
to the abduction, because it led to stressing an
immediate and sharp military strike. If the response
had been derived from a more comprehensive security
strategy, it would have been easier to take into
account Israels overall balance of strengths
and vulnerabilities, including the preparedness
of the civil population.
e. Another factor which largely contributed to
the failures is the weakness of the high staff work
available to the political leadership. This weakness
existed under all previous Prime Ministers and this
continuing failure is the responsibility of these
PMs and their cabinets. The current political leadership
did not act in a way that could compensate for this
lack, and did not rely sufficiently on other bodies
within and outside the security system that could
have helped it.
f. Israels government in its plenum failed
in its political function of taking full responsibility
for its decisions. It did not explore and seek adequate
response for various reservations that were raised,
and authorized an immediate military strike that
was not thought-through and suffered from over-reliance
on the judgment of the primary decision-makers.
g. Members of the IDFs general staff who
were familiar with the assessments and intelligence
concerning the Lebanon front, and the serious deficiencies
in preparedness and training, did not insist that
these should be considered within the army, and
did not alert the political leaders concerning the
flaws in the decisions and the way they were made.
16. As a result of our investigation, we make a
number of structural and institutional recommendations,
which require urgent attention:
a. The improvement of the quality of discussions
and decision making within the government through
strengthening and deepening staff work; strict enforcement
of the prohibition of leaks; improving the knowledge
base of all members of the government on core issues
of Israels challenges, and orderly procdures
for presentation of issues for discussion and resolution.
b. Full incorporation of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs in security decisions with political and
diplomatic aspects.
c. Substantial improvement in the functioning
of the National Security Council, the establishment
of a national assessment team, and creating a center
for crises management in the Prime Ministers
Office.
17. We regard it is of great importance to make
findings, reach conclusions and present recommendations
on the other critical issues which emerged in this
war. We will cover them in the final report, which
we strive to conclude soon. These subjects include,
among others, the direction of the war was led and
its management by the political echelon; the conduct
of the military campaign by the army; the civil-military
relationship in the war; taking care of Israels
civilian population under missile attack; the diplomatic
negotiations by the Prime Ministers office
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; censorship,
the media and secrecy; the effectiveness of Israels
media campaign; and the discussion of various social
and political processes which are essential for
a comprehensive analysis of the events of the war
and their significance.
18. Let us add a few final comments: It took the
government till March 2007 to name the events of
the summer of 2006 The Second Lebanon War.
After 25 years without a war, Israel experienced
a war of a different kind. The war thus brought
back to center stage some critical questions that
parts of Israeli society preferred to avoid.
19. The IDF was not ready for this war. Among the
many reasons for this we can mention a few: Some
of the political and military elites in Israel have
reached the conclusion that Israel is beyond the
era of wars. It had enough military might and superiority
to deter others from declaring war against her;
these would also be sufficient to send a painful
reminder to anyone who seemed to be undeterred;
since Israel did not intend to initiate a war, the
conclusion was that the main challenge facing the
land forces would be low intensity asymmetrical
conflicts.
20. Given these assumptions, the IDF did not need
to be prepared for real war. There was
also no urgent need to update in a systematic and
sophisticated way Israels overall security
strategy and to consider how to mobilize and combine
all its resources and sources of strength - political,
economic, social, military, spiritual. cultural
and scientific - to address the totality of the
challenges it faces.
21. We believe that - beyond the important need
to examine the failures of conducting the war and
the preparation for it, beyond the need to identify
the weaknesses (and strengths) in the decisions
made in the war - these are the main questions raised
by the Second Lebanon war. These are questions that
go far beyond the mandate of this or that commission
of inquiry; they are the questions that stand at
the center of our existence here as a Jewish and
democratic state. It would be a grave mistake to
concentrate only on the flaws revealed in the war
and not to address these basic issues.
We hope that our findings and conclusions in the
interim report and in the final report will not
only impel taking care of the serious governmental
flaws and failures we examine and expose, but will
also lead towards a renewed process in which Israeli
society, and its political and spiritual leaders
will take up and explore Israels long-term
aspirations and the ways to advance them.
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